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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a material deficit at the core of an important strain of
American property law scholarship—the debate over the nature and
extent of a landowner’s right to exclude non-owners from land.  By re-
ferring to a “material deficit” I do not mean to suggest that there is a
lack of theoretical sophistication regarding this subject.  For more
than a decade two rival camps of property theorists have made power-
ful, often intricate, and seemingly irreconcilable claims about the
function and normative value of exclusion rules in property law.  What
I mean is that when these two groups of property theorists engage
each other they tend to illustrate their arguments with discussion of
the same, relatively small set of classic American cases that form the
canon of most property law case books.
American law students know these cases well by the end of their
first year of law school.  They have evaluated trespass claims in the
agricultural plains of New Jersey1 and in a snowy field in Wisconsin.2
They have considered demands for public access to the beaches of New
Jersey3 and an abandoned railroad track in Vermont.4  And, of course,
they have pondered the confusing regulatory takings jurisprudence of
the United States Supreme Court.
The tendency of property theorists to dwell on these same cases
has two principal drawbacks.  First of all, it obviously produces a cer-
tain amount of redundancy, maybe even a sense of exhaustion among
1. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
2. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
3. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005); Mat-
thews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
4. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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property law scholars and students.  Second, and more important, the
failure of property law scholars to discover new property rule making
and decision making in action can freeze the imaginative capability of
theoretical scholarship.  This Article is designed to respond to both of
these deficiencies.
It responds to the first by leading readers abroad, to post-devolu-
tion Scotland, where a small band of recreational access advocates,
enlightened landowners, law reformers, legislators, and jurists have
done something remarkable.  In Part I of the Land Reform (Scotland)
Act 2003 (the LRSA),5 just the latest in a series of sweeping property
law reform initiatives in Scotland,6 the Scots have created a new kind
of property interest and a detailed property regime to contextualize
this interest.  At the heart of this regime is the right of responsible
access.  It is a right to go almost anywhere in Scotland, on most land
and inland water, whether privately owned or public, without a motor-
ized vehicle, for purposes of recreation, education, and passage, as
long as one acts responsibly.7
By introducing the LRSA and its right of responsible access to an
American property law audience this Article should help alleviate the
palpable shortage of new subjects in property law analysis.  In other
words, this Article provides an invaluable case study of a bold prop-
erty lawmaking scheme in action, which property law scholars can ex-
plore for years to come.
5. Part II of the LRSA creates a “community right to buy,” i.e., a preemptive right of
first refusal in favor of community groups who register an interest in purchasing
land for purposes of sustainable community development.  Part III of the LRSA
establishes a stronger, absolute crofting community right to buy. See generally
Malcolm M. Combe, Parts 2 and 3 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003: A
Definitive Answer to the Scottish Land Question? 2006 JURID. REV. 195.  Parts II
and III of the LRSA are beyond the scope of this Article.
6. See, e.g., Tenements (Scotland) Act, 2004, (A.S.P. 11) (modernizing condominium
law); Title Conditions (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 9) (modernizing law of title
conditions that run with land, including equivalents of real covenants, conserva-
tion easements, and common interest community covenants); Abolition of Feudal
Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act, 2000, (A.S.P. 5) (abolishing vestiges of feudal tenure).
For analyses of some of these reforms and other aspects of Scottish property law,
see John A. Lovett, Title Conditions in Restraint of Trade, in MIXED JURISDIC-
TIONS COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND 30 (Vernon Valentine
Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds., 2010); John A. Lovett, Meditations on
Strathclyde: Land Use Restrictions at the Crossroads of Legal Systems, 36 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1 (2008); John A. Lovett, Creating and Controlling Pri-
vate Land Use Restrictions in Scotland and Louisiana: A Comparative Mixed
Jurisdiction Analysis, 19 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 231 (2008); John A. Lovett, A
New Way: Servitude Relocation in Scotland and Louisiana, 9 EDIN. L.R. 352
(2005).
7. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 2(1) (“A person has access rights
only if they are exercised responsibly.”); id. §§ 1(2)–(4), 32.
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But this Article also has a normative component that responds to
the imaginative paralysis that can result from the deficit of new sub-
ject matter in property scholarship.  I argue that the LRSA shows us
something important about what is possible in property law design.  I
contend that Part I of the LRSA demonstrates—at least in this area of
property—that a property regime can embrace a social obligation
norm and a series of virtue-oriented standards of behavior without
sacrificing all of the information processing efficiencies and coordina-
tion benefits that information theorists contend flow from a property
law architecture founded on a core commitment to a robust, ex ante
presumption in favor of the right to exclude.
This is not to say that this model of property law design has no
costs.  I acknowledge that adoption of Part I of the LRSA has required
Scottish courts to develop several highly contextualized decision mak-
ing methodologies to interpret key portions of the Act designed to al-
low land owners to exempt some land from access taking and to
preserve certain barriers to access.  Recent judicial decisions inter-
preting the Act thus admittedly expose some of the information
processing and uncertainty costs that are by-products of this kind of
complex “governance” based property law innovation.  Yet the tests
and methodologies developed by the Scottish courts so far are, though
not perfect, generally reasonable and have largely succeeded in avoid-
ing demoralizing results.
Most importantly, though, I contend that because the LRSA actu-
ally replaces the traditionally robust, modular, ex ante presumption in
favor of the right to exclude with a surprisingly simple, but also ro-
bust, ex ante presumption in favor of responsible access, information
processing costs and coordination costs are not necessarily as high or
as destructive as some critics might have expected.  In the end I claim
that the LRSA’s reordering of private property rights in Scotland
reveals how a long cherished vision of shared social interests in land
can emerge as working legislation that promotes important aspects of
human flourishing while at the same time preserving land owners’
privacy interests and their prerogative to make crucial decisions about
how their land can be used productively, how that land fits into their
own life projects, and even how their land’s long term value can be
preserved for future access takers.
To help readers appreciate the significance of Scotland’s achieve-
ment in property law institutional design, this Article initially reviews
the theoretical debate over the fundamental structure and values of
property law in general and over the centrality of the right to exclude
in particular.  Section II.A explains the assumptions and goals of the
“progressive theorists,” those scholars who call for American property
law to embrace a social obligation norm aiming to maximize human
flourishing at all times and who welcome a more contextualized prop-
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erty law decision making process focused on producing relationships
of dignity, fairness, and respect.  Section II.B discusses the assump-
tions and aims of the leading “information” or “formal exclusion” theo-
rists, the scholars who insist upon the normative superiority, doctrinal
centrality, and above all, the informational efficiency of robust rules of
exclusion at the core of property law.  Section II.C briefly introduces
several other property theorists whose views on the right to exclude in
particular do not fit neatly in either of these camps but whose insights
are helpful in understanding the new property regime in Scotland.
To provide further context for understanding the emergence of the
right of responsible access, Part III briefly examines how Scottish
common law dealt unsuccessfully with the problem of demands for ac-
cess to private land prior to the LRSA.  Part IV discusses and con-
trasts the consensus building efforts and historical experiences that
led to the LRSA in Scotland with the different set of experiences that
led to passage of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (CRoW
Act), the legislation that established the better known but less radical
“right to roam” in England and Wales.  Part V then provides a compar-
ative analysis of the major features of the CRoW Act and the LRSA
and reveals how Scotland’s version of access legislation has not only a
wider geographic reach but has created a far more ambitious and po-
tentially transformative kind of access regime than is found in En-
gland and Wales.  Part VI analyzes recent judicial decisions in which
Scottish courts have begun to interpret key provisions of the LRSA
designed to balance the privacy and personal enjoyment interests of
home dwellers and the land management interests of other property
owners with the interests of Scotland’s statutorily protected access
takers.  Part VII concludes.
II. THE DEBATE OVER THE STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF
PROPERTY LAW AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
The decade of “the noughties” (roughly 2000–09) was an exciting
time for American property scholarship.  Perhaps one of the most dis-
tinctive aspects of the scholarly discussion about property law during
this period was the on-going, high level debate between two rival
camps of property theorists about the fundamental structure and val-
ues of property law in general and over the nature and importance of
the right to exclude in particular.  This portion of the Article discusses
the views of the key protagonists in this debate as well as the views of
several theorists who do not fit neatly into either category.
A. Progressive or Social Obligation Theorists
A prominent group of theorists who claim for themselves the moni-
ker “progressive” have contended that property law can and should
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embrace a social obligation norm designed to promote human flourish-
ing, or at least the basic human capabilities that allow individuals to
make reasoned and meaningful decisions about the projects they will
undertake in their lives.8  In a series of influential articles and books,
Gregory Alexander,9 Eduardo Pen˜alver,10 Joseph Singer,11 Eric
Freyfogle,12 and Jedediah Purdy13 have repeatedly argued that prop-
erty law is fundamentally about relationships: between neighboring
property owners or co-owners, between landlord and tenant, between
present possessor and future interest holder, between property own-
ers and non-owners, and between the property owner and the state.
Property law in their view must constantly recalibrate the needs and
demands of all these parties.  Property entitlements matter not so
much because of the negative liberty they provide to owners (and espe-
cially the shield that property provides from state interference) but
because of what they enable people (both owners and non-owners) to
become and to do with their lives in practices of social cooperation.
These “progressive” or “social obligation” theorists picture individ-
uals, and by extension property owners, as fundamentally dependent
on human community.14  In moments of conflict, this interdependence
requires property law decision makers to determine whether a prop-
erty owner’s interest in autonomy and control over her asset must be
sacrificed, sometimes without compensation or strict reciprocity, to
8. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property Law, 94 COR-
NELL L. REV. 743, 743–44 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander, Statement]; Jedediah
Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New
Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1258–60 (2005) [hereinafter Purdy, Freedom-
Promoting Approach].
9. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745
(2009) [hereinafter Alexander, Social-Obligation].
10. Eduardo M. Pen˜alver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009) [hereinafter
Pen˜alver, Land Virtues]; Eduardo M. Pen˜alver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L.
REV. 1889 (2005) [hereinafter Pen˜alver, Property as Entrance].
11. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Demo-
cratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009) [hereinafter Singer, Democratic
Estates]; Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property:
Castles, Investments and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (2006)
[hereinafter Singer, Ownership Society]; Joseph William Singer, After the Flood:
Equality & Humanity in Property Regimes, 52 LOY. L. REV. 243 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter Singer, After the Flood].
12. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE
OWNERSHIP OF LAND (2007).
13. JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY (2010); Jedediah Purdy, People as
Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the Freedom-Promoting Approach to
Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047 (2007) [hereinafter Purdy, People as Resources];
Purdy, Freedom-Promoting Approach, supra note 8.
14. Alexander, Social-Obligation, supra note 9, at 761–70; Pen˜alver, Land Virtues,
supra note 10, at 869–70; Pen˜alver, Property as Entrance, supra note 10, at
1911–17; Purdy, People as Resources, supra note 13, at 1092–94; Singer, After the
Flood, supra note 11, at 264–66.
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satisfy a non-owner’s need for access to that asset or the community’s
interest in control over use or disposition of that asset.15  In determin-
ing the extent of this need for sacrifice, the progressive theorists tell
us that property law has nothing to fear from open-textured standards
that allow courts to make ex post, fine-tuned, contextualized decisions
about the relative needs and interests of competing property owners,
owners and non-owners, or owners and the community, even in cases
where property rights have traditionally been protected with rela-
tively crystalline, ex ante rules of exclusion.16
Further, in making decisions about land use, for instance, courts
will have to consider not just how to maximize a parcel of land’s mar-
ket value and the owner’s market return, but they will have to (and
already do so more than we realize) consider concepts similar to what
Pen˜alver calls “land’s complexity” and “land’s memory.”17  In addition,
some of these theorists, particularly Alexander and Pen˜alver, insist
that property law has much to learn from the Aristotelian tradition of
virtue ethics and should not be afraid to test property owner behavior
by considering the application of several “land virtues,” specifically
the virtues of industry, justice, and humility.18
15. Alexander, Social-Obligation, supra note 9, at 770–73.
16. Id. at 801–10 (illustrating with a discussion of Matthews v. Bay Head Improve-
ment Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984), and State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J.
1971)); Pen˜alver, Land Virtues, supra note 10, at 864–86; Singer, Ownership So-
ciety, supra note 11, at 328–37 (endorsing Supreme Court’s use of a “citizenship
model” for takings questions in Penn Central Transport Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 123 (1978)).
17. By referring to “land’s complexity,” Pen˜alver seeks not only to capture the com-
monplace idea that every parcel of land is unique in a some physical sense but
also to remind us that parcels of land can vary dramatically in their ecological
and environmental characteristics and, perhaps even more importantly, in their
“social dimension.”  Pen˜alver, Land Virtues, supra note 10, at 828–29.  Pointing
out that “human ingenuity” and human labor can transform land in extraordina-
rily positive and negative ways, he observes that every parcel will gain complex-
ity because of the myriad ways it shapes “human interactions” and the
idiosyncratic ways it affects access to other parcels of land and other land uses.
Id. at 829.  When Pen˜alver refers to “land’s memory,” he invokes not only the
long-lasting physical manifestations of human engagement with land but also the
powerful psychological attachments that develop when humans possess property
for any length of time. Id. at 829–30.
18. Alexander, Social-Obligation, supra note 9, at 760–61; Pen˜alver, Land Virtues,
supra note 10, at 864–86.  For Pen˜alver, the virtue of “industry” refers to “encour-
aging the productive and efficient use of land.” Id. at 877.  The virtue of “justice”
requires consideration of  how the “fruits of the land’s productivity” and, crucially
in relation to the subject of this Article, how access to “the land itself” can be
distributed in a way that serves human flourishing. Id.  Finally, the virtue of
“humility” recognizes that one generation’s use of land may irreversibly harm the
ability of future generations to flourish. Id.
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At the end of the day, these theorists’ key point of agreement is
that property law can serve “plural and incommensurable values.”19
Although economic efficiency, generating wealth, and welfare max-
imization are among these values, they are not, and should not be, the
only metrics of analysis.20  Other equally important values that can
serve as polestars of property law decision making include, in addition
to human flourishing itself, the promotion of human freedom (and es-
pecially the freedom to recruit or be recruited for social projects on
grounds of reciprocity, persuasion, and negotiated cooperation),21 the
creation of a free and democratic society in which human beings are
treated with equal dignity and respect,22 and the preservation of our
natural and human environment to serve the needs of future genera-
tions and even the interests of the non-human world.23  Throughout
the progressive theorists’ writing, there is a consistent willingness to
discuss virtues and virtuous behavior and to consider how human be-
ings should treat each other.  Rather than serving as platforms for
self-regarding behavior, property ownership and property law become
the place for building community, not merely satisfying personal
preferences.
B. Information or Formal Exclusion Theorists
Competing against these progressive theorists is a group that is
sometimes referred to as the “information” theorists,24 who we might
also call “formal exclusion” theorists.  These theorists contend that at
the very core of any properly functioning private property regime is a
robust commitment to protecting a property owner’s right to exclude
everyone else in the world from the object of his ownership.  Their jus-
tifications for this core commitment to exclusion, to a vision of prop-
erty as “thing-ownership,” are both moral and utilitarian.  Currently
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith’s versions of this exclusion oriented
view of property are the most vital and influential.25
19. Alexander, Statement, supra note 8, at 743; Alexander, Social-Obligation, supra
note 9, at 805; Pen˜alver, Land Virtues, supra note 10, at 867–69; Singer, Demo-
cratic Estates, supra note 11, at 1054.
20. Alexander, supra note 8, at 805; Pen˜alver, Land Virtues, supra note 10, at 863;
Singer, Democratic Estates, supra note 11, at 1034–37.
21. Purdy, People as Resources, supra note 13, at 1110–14; Purdy, Freedom-Promot-
ing Approach, supra note 8, at 1242–44.
22. Singer, Democratic Estates, supra note 11, at 1037, 1051–52.
23. FREYFOGLE; supra note 12, at 138–41; Pen˜alver, Land Virtues, supra note 10, at
884–86 (describing the land virtue of “humility”).
24. Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917,
918, 924–27 (2010).
25. Merrill and Smith’s insights into property law have been articulated in numerous
articles. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Prop-
erty, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Morality
of Property]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property
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In Property and the Right to Exclude, a foundational essay that
helped launch the exclusion theory debate, Merrill claimed that the
right of a property owner to exclude others is not just “one of the most
essential” sticks in the bundle that is often seen as comprising prop-
erty,26 but is in fact the “sine qua non” of property.27  As he put it:
“Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued resource . . .
and you give them property.  Deny someone the exclusion right and
they do not have property.”28
For Merrill, the right to exclude is a “necessary and sufficient con-
dition of identifying the existence of property.”29  He claims that this
prioritization of the right to exclude can be justified on numerous
grounds: (1) its logical utility (i.e., the notion that most of the other
attributes of property can be deduced by simply clarifying or modify-
ing the right to exclude);30 (2) its deep historical and anthropological
roots;31 and (3) its sheer “ubiquity” in mature legal systems.32  For
Merrill, a robust defense of the right to exclude is essential to guard
against the disintegrating effects of legal realism and its bundle-of-
sticks approach to property, concepts that threaten to strip property of
its institutional coherence and social value.33
in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE. L.J. 357 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith,
What Happened to Property]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Prop-
erty/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill &
Smith, Property/Contract Interface]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Opti-
mal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle,
110 YALE. L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization];
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion
Versus Governance].  For a recent, prominent case book by these authors, see
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
(2007).
26. This claim was famously made by the United States Supreme Court in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979), and was repeated in subsequent
decisions. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
27. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730
(1998) [hereinafter Merrill, Right to Exclude].
28. Id.
29. Id. at 731.
30. Id. at 740–44.
31. Id. at 745–47 (citing WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLO-
NISTS AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 62 (1983); Robert E. Ellickson, Prop-
erty in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1364–65 (1993)).  Merrill asserts that “[i]t is
commonly believed that the most elementary form of property right in land is the
usufruct, an exclusive right to engage in particular uses of the land that is non-
transferable and that terminates when the owner dies or ceases the use.” Id. at
745–46.  If primitive societies first developed an exclusive usufruct-like right,
Merrill reasons, this use exclusion must be “foundational” or “more basic to the
institution of property” than other incidents of property. Id. at 745–47.
32. Id. at 747–51.
33. Id. at 736–39.
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Henry Smith’s writings over the past decade have largely corrobo-
rated Merrill’s insights but have added his distinctive information-
processing-cost rationale to the defense of exclusion.34  In his recent
response to Alexander’s important article calling for incorporation of a
social obligation norm in American property law,35 Smith takes us to
the nub of the debate.  Although he acknowledges the intuitive attrac-
tiveness of human flourishing as a societal goal,36 Smith asserts that
property law and scholarship cannot afford to become overly con-
cerned with promoting desirable social ends.  Rather, it must focus on
means, on how property law goes about its business of serving human
interests—and especially on what property law does well, at least in
comparison to other branches of the law.  Smith thus draws us to his
(and Merrill’s) key insight: that property law’s comparative advan-
tage, its exceptionalism, lies in solving problems “wholesale,” in coordi-
nating action for a wide range of often anonymous actors.37  Thus, the
essence of property resides in its unique “in rem” quality, its ability to
speak in modular and informationally dense ways to those who must
deal with property in a complex and heterogeneous world in which
most individuals have little prior information about each other.38
Property law accomplishes this by providing default packages of
rights that decide important questions ex ante for everyone.39  The
numerus clausus principle, the strict limitation on the number and
type of property ownership forms in both the civil and common law,
illustrates this demand for standardization at the macro level.40  Mer-
rill and Smith’s favorite example of such a default package at the level
of individual rules is the right-to-exclude principle that underscores
the mechanistic and crystalline law of trespass.41  Yet another,
slightly more complex, but still favorite example is the baseline rule in
nuisance—namely that a residential property owner is entitled to be
free of pollution.42  The great benefit of these simple, ex ante property
34. Smith began to elaborate his information processing approach and his exclusion
versus governance strategy paradigm in 2002 in Smith, Exclusion Versus Govern-
ance, supra note 25, but he and Merrill introduced the concept together at
roughly the same time in Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra
note 25, at 393–96.
35. Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means
in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009) [hereinafter Smith,
Mind the Gap].
36. Id. at 960.
37. Merrill & Smith, Morality of Property, supra note 25, at 1852; Smith, Mind the
Gap, supra note 35, at 963.
38. Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract Interface, supra note 25, at 793–95.
39. Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 25, at 24–40.
40. Id.
41. Thomas Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 16–19 (1985); Merrill & Smith, Morality of Prop-
erty, supra note 25, at 1871–74.
42. Smith, Mind the Gap, supra note 35, at 963–64.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB403.txt unknown Seq: 11 21-JUL-11 12:36
2011] PROGRESSIVE PROPERTY IN ACTION 749
rules, according to Smith, is that they reduce information processing
costs for those subject to the rules (i.e., duty holders and non-owners),
those who might like to acquire property (i.e., other market partici-
pants), and the officials who must administer these rules (i.e.,
judges).43
Like Merrill before him,44 Smith is quick to acknowledge that a
property owner’s general right to exclude non-owners and to decide
the uses to which his property can be put is “not an end in itself, and is
far from absolute even as a means.”45  When it confronts a subject of
enough importance, or when parties cannot reach bargains easily on
their own, or when we simply do not trust bargaining’s results, prop-
erty law will subordinate an owner’s simple ex ante exclusion rights to
larger social interests.46  The general pattern that emerges according
to Merrill and Smith is “exclusion” at the core—an ex ante rebuttable
presumption in favor of the owner’s right to exclude non-owners and to
determine the use of the property—and “governance” at the periph-
ery.47  By “governance” Smith does not necessarily imply government
regulation; he merely means more carefully tailored, contextualized
solutions that openly refer to some collective ends society hopes to
achieve—something akin to what the progressive theorists are calling
for more generally.48
It is not easy to reconcile the approach of these information or for-
mal exclusion theorists with the basic assumptions of the progressive
theorists.  As Jane Baron has recently observed, both groups of schol-
ars’ understanding of property is founded on divergent and “contested
commitments.”49  While the information theorists like Merrill and
43. Id. at 964.  In their seminal article on the numerus clausus principle, Merrill and
Smith made a similar point about the information cost advantage of limiting the
number of property forms that are available in any property regime.  Merrill &
Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 25, at 27–33.
44. Merrill admitted even at the time of his seminal article that an individual’s right
to exclude might be diminished or reduced in various contexts depending on the
identities and needs of non-owners and the kinds of interference presented.  Mer-
rill, Right to Exclude, supra note 27, at 753.
45. Smith, Mind the Gap, supra note 35, at 964.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 964, 967.  Merrill and Smith point to aviation rights, the doctrine of neces-
sity in trespass, anti-discrimination laws, restraints on future alienation such as
the rule against perpetuities, and the law of trusts as just some of the most easily
recognizable examples of “governance” rules—where “situational morality” and
“fine-tuned regulation” are called for in property law.  Merrill and Smith, Moral-
ity of Property, supra note 25, at 1890–94; Smith, Mind the Gap, supra note 35, at
964.
48. Smith, Mind the Gap, supra note 35, at 964–65.
49. Baron, supra note 24, at 920–21.  All that they share, Baron shrewdly notes, is
the salience of a core and periphery metaphor.  They disagree profoundly about
what should be the content of property law’s core and the moral justifications for
their core ideals. Id. at 962–63.
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Smith tend to view property metaphorically as an information gener-
ating “machine” that produces, on average, good enough outcomes, the
progressive theorists see property law as an on-going “conversation”
that should be geared toward identifying human values, dislodging
unconscious presumptions, improving the quality and character of so-
cial relationships, and creating a more just distribution of resources to
facilitate more human flourishing.50  While the information theorists
favor simplicity, stability, and predictability, the progressives em-
brace complexity, contingency, and contextualism.51  While the infor-
mation theorists are ambivalent about change within property law,
even when change is needed they are nervous about radical revision
and prefer for any innovation to emanate from legislatures.52  The
progressives, on the other hand, are more impatient and ready to ac-
cept dynamism whatever its institutional source.53  In short, as Baron
has suggested insightfully, the information theorists see themselves
as mechanical engineers concerned with promoting functional effi-
ciency within the legal system and the marketplace, whereas progres-
sive theorists see themselves as social engineers aiming to produce a
“virtuous, free, or democratic society.”54
C. Other Voices: Reciprocity Theorists and Exclusive Use
Theorists
Lying somewhere in between (or beyond) the progressive theorists
and the information theorists are other important voices engaged in
the exclusion debate.  Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller, for instance,
have emphasized the importance of the “right to exit” from property
relationships as the hallmark of liberal property law.55  Guaranteeing
that persons who participate in property relationships have a viable
right to exit from these relationships not only preserves their individ-
ual liberty and security but also serves to curb harmful, invasive, and
50. Id. at 920–21, 937–39.  Baron also notes that each camp views the relationship
between rights and duties differently.  For information theorists, property law is
fundamentally a system in which right holders send a one-way message to duty
holders: “keep out.”  This informational simplicity allows it to coordinate behavior
efficiently. Id. at 954–55.  For progressive theorists, property law constantly il-
lustrates how property owners are at once both right holders and duty holders or,
to be more precise, subject to obligations to other owners and non-owners. Id. at
955–57.
51. Id. at 940–52.
52. Id. at 944, 960–61.
53. Id. at 923, 945, 961.  Whereas the progressive theorists are clearly committed to
making “distributional fairness” a concern of property, the information theorists
believe other institutional mechanisms, like taxation and government transfer
systems, are a more efficient means of promoting this end. Id. at 957–59.
54. Id. at 964.
55. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549,
567–70 (2001).
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opportunistic behavior on the part of their co-venturers.56  Thus, a
healthy right to exit can discipline commoners and even encourage
trust and cooperation among participants in a property regime57—
just the kind of virtuous, other-regarding behavior that the progres-
sive property theorist seeks to promote.
More broadly still, Dagan has argued that if government or prop-
erty laws do impose limits on a property owner’s right to exclude or
exclusive authority over the use of a resource, they can do so only if
those limitations create some long-term pay-off for the property
owner.58  In other words, a social obligation limitation on private
property will only be legitimate if it is based on some long-term reci-
procity, some explicit or implicit contractarian bargain.  In sum, Da-
gan and Heller are committed to the liberal notion that property
owners have powerful autonomy-based reasons to protect exclusion
and exit rights, but they seek to soften property liberalism of the kind
promoted by Merrill and Smith by finding avenues for private actors
to come together in voluntary relationships, networks, and communi-
ties of cooperation and trust-building.
Although they may not regard themselves as forming a cohesive
theoretical school, another group of scholars consisting of Adam Mos-
soff, Eric Claeys, and Larissa Katz have made similar (and for our
purposes very helpful) points about property law in recent years.59
First, all three theorists reject the conceptually disintegrating effect of
the legal realists’ bundle-of-rights view of ownership.60  As a corollary,
56. Id. at 568.
57. Id.  Dagan and Heller’s favorite examples of how robust exit rights enhance coop-
eration and trust include the rights of partners to terminate a partnership, the
rights of beneficiaries to terminate a trust, the right of a spouse to seek a divorce
and terminate a marital property regime, and the right of shareholders to sell
their shares or liquidate a corporation. Id. at 597.
58. Hanoch Dagan, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1255, 1263 (2007); Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L.
REV. 741, 769–70, 771–73 (1999).  Dagan’s views on the importance of reciprocity
overlap to some extent with Purdy’s claims that the functional purpose of prop-
erty law is to provide the framework for individuals to recruit one another into
cooperative projects based on norms of reciprocity and respect, not subordination
and domination.  Purdy, Freedom-Promoting Approach, supra note 8, at 1242–44.
59. See Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 617 (2009) [hereinafter Claeys, Property 101]; Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and
Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889 (2009) [hereinafter
Claeys, Virtue and Rights]; Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property
Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275 (2008); Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting
the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003).
60. Claeys, Property 101, supra note 59, at 618–19, 631; Katz, supra note 59, at 276,
279; Mossoff, supra note 59, at 372 (claiming sympathy with Merrill’s resistance
to the “acid wash of nominalism”).  Claeys, in particular, argues that the legal
realists co-opted the formal right to exclude identified by the Hohfield–Honore
vocabulary to justify an instrumentalist agenda and “interventionist property
regulation.”  Claeys, Property 101, supra note 59, at 635–36.
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all three embrace the idea that some kind of unifying and robust ex-
clusion right exists at the core of property ownership.61  Where they
diverge from Merrill and Smith, however, is in their shared contention
that the central value that property law protects is not so much a for-
malistic, boundary-drawing right to exclude, but the exclusive author-
ity of property owners to make decisions or set agendas about the use
to which property can be put.  Hence, I call these scholars the “exclu-
sive use” theorists.
Drawing inspiration from “rights based” property theorists (i.e.,
James Harris, Jeremy Waldron, and J.E. Penner), Larissa Katz in
particular argues that property’s key task is to protect “our enduring
interest in determining the use of things,” a key aspect of our personal
autonomy.62  Utilitarian or “costs-based” exclusion theorists like Mer-
rill and Smith, she complains, focus too much on boundaries in defin-
ing ownership and too much on the duties of non-owners to obey
exclusion orders and meanwhile neglect the special “powers” of own-
ers that the law wants to advance.63  Adopting a political analogy,
Katz argues that owners, just like sovereigns, occupy an “exclusive
position that does not depend for its exclusivity on the right to exclude
others from the object of the right,” but on the fact that “owners are in
a special position to set the agenda for a resource.”64  Thus, the essen-
tial right in property is not a formal right to exclude keyed to protect-
ing the boundaries of a thing, but the exclusive right of the property
owner to set the agenda for a resource.65  Importantly for our pur-
poses, Katz illustrates her “agenda setting” approach to property in
part by briefly describing the Scandinavian custom of Allemansratt,
one of the important legal sources for the LRSA.66
In an important and more normatively focused response to Alexan-
der and Pen˜alver, Eric Claeys also warns that social obligation theo-
rists’ search for virtuous behavior and distributive justice at the core,
rather than at the periphery, of property law could have troubling con-
61. Claeys, Property 101, supra note 59, at 631; Katz, supra note 59, at 280; Mossoff,
supra note 59, at 375.
62. Katz, supra note 59, at 280 (discussing JAMES HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE
(1996); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997); JEREMY WALDRON,
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988)).
63. Id. at 276–77, 280 & n.13.
64. Id. at 277–78.
65. Id. at 283–84.  Katz asserts that her “agenda setting” account of property is supe-
rior to other accounts because it explains why ownership does not always require
non-owners to keep out of property but does insist that non-owners “fall in line
with the agenda the owner has set.” Id. at 278.
66. See id. at 298–99.  According to Katz, Allemansratt is a principle that “ensures
that anyone can use rural land for recreational purposes, so long as these uses are
not inconsistent with the uses to which the owner has decided to put the land.”
Id.
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sequences.67  By subordinating individual property rights and a ro-
bust right to exclude to judicial discretion over questions of when and
to what extent an owner must sacrifice his property to satisfy the
human flourishing needs of a non-owner, property law might sacrifice
some of the key social gains made by the Enlightenment.68  In particu-
lar, it might encourage certain factions—religious, economic, class
based, or political—to seize the heights of property law decision mak-
ing and acquire “hegemonic power,”69 thus transforming property law
into a setting for troubling “culture war fights”70 or even more unset-
tling forms of strife.
This review of the basic positions of the progressive and informa-
tion theorists, as well as those interested in reciprocity and exclusive
use, reveals how divided contemporary scholars are over the role that
exclusion does and should play in property law.  It also suggests how
intensely interested we remain in this subject.  My goal here is not to
resolve the conflicts between these theorists at a conceptual level.  In-
stead the aim has been to create a framework of analysis and an en-
riched vocabulary that will prove useful as we begin to explore the
forces that lead to the emergence of the LRSA and as we examine its
most important design features.
III. LIMITATIONS ON PUBLIC ACCESS AT SCOTS
COMMON LAW
A. Public Rights of Way and Community Rights
Scottish common law has long recognized that the public can ac-
quire a real right of access over privately owned land through what is
called a “public right of way.”71  Just as with an Anglo-American ser-
vitude or easement, the solum or ownership of the ground itself re-
mains with the underlying landowner, be it a private person or a
67. Claeys, Virtue and Rights, supra note 59, at 922–23.
68. As Claeys observes, communitarian theorists like Alexander and Pen˜alver “take
for granted the tough-minded choices early Enlightenment theorists made to con-
fine virtue and elevate rights as the dominant category of public discourse.” Id.
at 924.  Elsewhere, Claeys explains that Locke’s accomplishment was in some
sense to “compartmentalize virtue as far away from politics as possible,” id. at
928, or to assign the “perfection of human character and the pursuit of happiness
. . . to the private realm.” Id. at 929.
69. Id. at 917.
70. Id. at 922 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Claeys’ critique of Alexander and
Pen˜alver’s virtue based approach to property law obviously brings him much
closer normatively to Merrill and Smith than Katz, whose normative commit-
ments appear more closely aligned with the progressive theorists. See Katz,
supra note 59, at 314–15.
71. KENNETH G.C. REID, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN SCOTLAND ¶ 495 (1996) (“A public
right of way is distinguishable from a public street or highway maintainable at
the public expense which requires at all times to be kept free of obstruction of any
form.”).
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public entity.72  Yet, unlike most servitudes or easements, there is no
specific benefitted property (or dominant estate).  Rather, the bene-
fited persons are simply members of the public at large.73  In the
United States, we would classify these as servitudes or easements in
gross in favor of the public.74
These common law “public rights of way” often originated in old
cross-country routes traversed by foot or on horseback, connecting one
town or village with another.75  Some were ancient “drove-roads” that
were used to lead cattle and sheep to markets.76  Others were “kirk”
roads meandering their way to a local church.77  Finally, others still
were “coffin” roads terminating at a graveyard.78  Important as these
public rights of way were,79 their utility and occurrence has always
been circumscribed by several doctrinal limitations.
At the outset, a public right of way must connect two “public
places,” that is, places to which the public has “resort for a lawful pur-
pose,”80 or, in other words, a “legal” and “unrestricted right of access
at all times.”81  Places that qualify include public roads, public
harbors, beaches used for public recreation, towns, and even church-
72. Id.  Technically, the burdened property may be either open ground or a structure
through which some kind of passage has been created, such as a covered walkway
over a road. See, e.g., Cumbernauld and Kilsyth Dist. Council v. Dollar Land
(Cumbernauld) Ltd., (1993) S.C.(H.L.) 44 (Scot.).
73. REID, supra note 71, ¶ 495.
74. For discussion of servitudes benefiting the public; their creation through dedica-
tion, prescription, and on the basis of custom and the public trust doctrine; their
limitations; and their regulation, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
§ 2.18 cmt. a–g (2000); JON W. BRUCE AND JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASE-
MENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND §§ 5:25–5:29, 6:2–6:3 (2010).





79. According to the National Catalogue of Rights of Way maintained by the Scottish
Rights of Way and Access Society, there are more than 7000 recorded rights of
way currently in Scotland. Is There Any Record of Rights of Way in Scotland?,
SCOTTISH RIGHTS OF WAY & ACCESS SOCIETY (Aug. 2, 2008, 6:09 PM), http://www.
scotways.com/inex.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=216:is-there-any-
record-of-rights-of-way-in-scotland&catid=38:rights-of-way&Itemid=72. Many
other rights of way are unrecorded. Id.  Information from the Catalogue about
particular rights of way can be obtained from the ScotWays Office. Is Informa-
tion About Particular Rights of Way Available On The Internet?, SCOTTISH RIGHTS




80. GEORGE L. GRETTON & ANDREW J.M. STEVEN, PROPERTY, TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION
247 (2009); REID, supra note 71, ¶ 496.
81. PIK Facilities Ltd. v. Watson’s Ayr Park Ltd., (2005) S.L.T. 1041, 1049 (Scot.).
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yards.82  But a cattle market open only a few days a week might not
satisfy the public place terminus requirement,83 and other destina-
tions clearly fail to meet the test, including a small, sub-post office in a
private house,84 a geologically noteworthy and curiously large rock
next to the seashore,85 and even a large but limited-access commercial
airport.86  Reading the opinions on what constitutes a “public place”
for purposes of establishing a public right of way, one senses not only
the narrow construction habits of Scottish judges but a certain reluc-
tance to admit any incursion of private property rights.  As one per-
haps more sympathetic judge observed in 1917, even logic was not a
necessary ingredient to this doctrinal puzzle because the requirement
that a right of way connect two public places meant that a well used
footpath making a pleasant circuit from one point on a public road
would still fail the test.87
The second doctrinal limitation is that a public right of way per-
mits only locomotion across the burdened property, not any other re-
lated recreational activity.88  The only non-access activities that might
be permitted under a public right of way are purely ancillary ones, like
the placing of signs to show its existence.89  Hence, as with any other
common law servitude, activities like bike riding or horse riding would
82. REID, supra note 71, ¶ 496. Compare Lauder v. MacColl, (1993) S.C.L.R. 753
(Scot.) (holding that the foreshore is a public place); Richardson v. Cromarty Pe-
troleum Co. Ltd., (1982) S.L.T. 237, 238 (Scot.) (holding that a way terminating at
a public road and a foreshore regularly used by the public for recreation met the
test); Marquis of Bute v. M’Kirdy & M’Millan Ltd., (1937) S.C. 93 (Scot.) (holding
that Scalpsie Bay on the Isle of Bute is a public place); Smith v. Saxton, (1927)
S.C.(Notes) 98, 99 (Scot.) (holding that a church and churchyard qualify even if
the church is in ruin); Scott v. Drummond, (1865) 5 M. 771, 772 (Scot.) (holding
that a small natural harbor used by fishermen and other members of the public
met the test); with Darrie v. Drummond, (1865) 3 M. 496, 501 (Lord Deas) (Scot.)
(holding that a mere spot on the seashore is not a public place but a beach with a
history of public recreation like Portobello Beach in Edinburgh could be).
83. Ayr Burgh Council v. British Transport Comm., (1955) S.L.T. 219, 222 (Lord
Carmont) (Scot.).
84. Love-Lee v. Cameron of Lochiel, (1991) S.C.L.R. 61, 67–68 (Scot.).
85. Duncan v. Lees, (1870) 9 M. 274, 276 (Scot.).
86. PIK Facilities Ltd. v. Watson’s Ayr Park Ltd., (2005) S.L.T. 1041, 1049–50 (Scot.).
In this case, the party seeking to establish the public right of way was the opera-
tor of a remote parking lot seeking to gain unrestricted access to the airport to
pick up and drop customers in a van, and so perhaps he was not as sympathetic a
claimant as the typical recreational user in other cases. Id. at 1042–43.
87. Rhins Dist. Comm. v. Cuninghame, (1917) 2 S.L.T. 169, 170 (Lord Sands) (Scot.).
88. GRETTON & STEVEN, supra note 80, at 248.
89. Id.  Under the Land Reform (Scotland) Act, local authorities now have statutory
authority to install and maintain facilities that improve the “comfort and conve-
nience” of those exercising a public right of way.  Land Reform (Scotland) Act,
2003, (A.S.P. 2), §§ 15(4), 31.
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not be permitted, unless such use itself was instrumental in establish-
ing the right of way.90
Third, and perhaps most important, because a public right of way’s
purpose is to provide access from one public place to another, it must
have a “definable course” and cannot provide access for general and
indiscriminant wandering over another’s private land.91  Thus a pub-
lic right of way in Scotland cannot provide an unlimited “right to
roam.”92  As Lord Justice-Clerk Hope put it in a decisive 1849 opinion:
“There is no case whatever in which a right to wander over, to rest or
to lounge upon the ground of a private proprietor, under the new name
of recreation, has ever been sustained.”93
Finally, the constitutive requirements for establishing a public
right of way by positive prescription have limited the frequency of
their occurrence in Scotland.94  Thus, to transform an “asserted” or
“claimed” right of way into a “vindicated” one,95 some representative
of the public must prove (in addition to the two public termini and a
definite route) that the public’s possession and use (1) runs along the
entire length of the right of way, (2) has been continuous and uninter-
rupted for a period of twenty years, (3) is substantial given the charac-
ter of the locality, and (4) is adverse to and not merely tolerated by the
landowner.96  The hostility requirement is probably the most difficult
90. See, e.g., Marquis of Bute v. M’Kirdy & M’Millan, (1937) S.C. 93, 95 (Scot.) (find-
ing no right-of-way over track for passengers by horse or motor vehicle but find-
ing one for foot passengers).
91. REID, supra note 71, ¶ 497; see, e.g., Mackintosh v. Moir, (1871) 9 M. 574, 575–76
(Lord President Inglis) (Scot.); id. at 578–79 (Lord Ardmillan) (finding that a pub-
lic right of way could not “emerge in law from a mere practice of sauntering”).
Although a path need not be “visible” in all cases, for instance when it crosses
some part of the foreshore, it must be “definite” all the same. Rhins Dist. Comm.,
2 S.L.T. at 171 (Lord Sands).
92. Jeremy Rowan-Robinson & Andrea Ross, The Freedom to Roam and Implied Per-
mission, 2 EDIN. L.R. 225, 227 (1998).
93. Dyce v. Hay, (1849) 11 D. 1266, 1275 (Scot.), aff’d, (1852) 1 Macq. (H.L.) 305
(Scot.).
94. Although it is theoretically possible to create a right of way by deed, most public
rights of way are created by positive prescription and without registration in the
public land records. GRETTON & STEVEN, supra note 80, at 248.  Prior to the en-
actment of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act in 1973, the requisite
period of use necessary to establish a public right of way was forty years, though
courts were often lenient with regard to evidence of use in the early part of the
period.  Today,  the statutory period is only twenty years.  Prescription and Limi-
tation (Scotland) Act, 1973, c. 52, § 3(3).
95. This terminology is taken from the National Catalogue of Rights of Way. Na-
tional Catalogue of Rights of Way (CROW), SCOTTISH RIGHTS OF WAY & ACCESS
SOC’Y (Jul. 27, 2008, 9:21AM), http://scotways.com/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=47:national-catalogue-of-rights-of-way-crow&catid=34:
about-rights-of-way&Itemid=66.
96. GRETTON & STEVEN, supra note 80, at 248; REID, supra note 71, ¶¶ 500–01.  To
appreciate the difficulty advocates historically faced in establishing public rights
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to establish, as the line between hostile occupation (leading to pre-
scription) and implicit toleration (which does not) is often difficult to
draw in actual cases.97
At the end of the twentieth century, public rights of way were seen
as an insufficient response to the public’s need for recreational and
education access to enclosed land for two principal reasons.  First, as
we have seen, the doctrinal limitations and stringent grounds for con-
stituting a public right of way were simply too confining and created
too much uncertainty for those who sought greater recreational ac-
cess.  One scholar who studied access rights carefully and was deeply
involved in the consensus building efforts that eventually led to the
enactment of the LRSA estimated in 2003 that although there were
15,000 kilometers of “claimed public rights of way in Scotland . . . the
legal status of 80 percent of those routes was uncertain.”98  Just as
important, even if the legal doubts surrounding many claimed rights
of way could have been cleared up, there was a strong sense that these
routes still would not provide sufficient access over enclosed ground
close to where most people in Scotland actually lived and thus where
the greatest demand for recreational and educational access could be
found.99
One other common law form—the elusive and obscure category of
“community rights”—also failed to satisfy the growing demand for rec-
reational access in Scotland.100  This category of public rights theoret-
ically belong to members of a particular community like a town or
village and provides access over land within (and perhaps adjacent to)
of way, see Richardson v. Cromarty Petroleum Co. Ltd., (1982) S.L.T. 237, 238
(Scot.) (denying prescription because there were multiple ways of reaching one of
the claimed termini, an area of foreshore, because there was insufficient evidence
of the quantity of public use of a recreational footpath); Strathclyde (Hyndland)
Hous. Soc’y Ltd. v. Cowie, (1983) S.L.T. 61, 62–63, 66 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.) (denying
prescription because of insufficient end-to-end use of a mews lane even though
various properties could be reached along the way).
97. Under the relevant statute of limitations in Scotland, the hostility element is ex-
pressed by the requirement that the possession be open, peaceable, and without
judicial interference.  Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act, 1973, c. 52,
§ 3(3).  For discussion of the distinction between prescriptive user as of right and
use by “mere tolerance,” see Marquis of Bute v. M’Kirdy & M’Millan, (1937) S.C.
93, 120–21 (Lord President Normand) (Scot.) (observing that “if a proprietor lies
by while regular and unrestricted public use is made of a private road between
two public termini for the prescriptive period, the law will assume a public right
rather than an easy-going proprietor”).
98. Jeremy Rowan-Robinson, Reform of the Law Relating to Access to the Country-
side: Realising Expectations?, 2003 J. PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 1394, 1396 (2003).
99. SCOTTISH NATURAL HERITAGE, ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE FOR OPEN AIR RECRE-
ATION: SCOTTISH NATURAL HERITAGE’S ADVICE TO GOVERNMENT 7 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE].
100. Andrea Loux Jarman, Customary Rights in Scots Law: Test Cases on Access to
Land in the Nineteenth Century, 28 J. LEGAL HIST. 207 (2007).
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that community for recreation or for more pedestrian activities like
bleaching or pasturage.101  These rights became highly politicized in
nineteenth century Scotland as demands for open spaces available for
recreation increased in response to urbanization and industrializa-
tion.102  Politicization led both landowners and advocates for the pub-
lic to bring several high profile test cases.103
In the first of these test cases, which involved alleged rights to
draw water from a well and to wash, bleach, and dry clothes on land
adjacent to the well (all within the limits of the burgh), the Court of
Session recognized that inhabitants of a mere burgh of barony were
entitled to the same level of common law protection as inhabitants of a
royal burgh.104  In addition, the court recognized that the burgh supe-
rior owed a kind of fiduciary duty to manage property subject to these
community rights for the interest of all burgh inhabitants who histori-
cally used the land, even though they had neglected to exercise their
rights to elect a magistrate for the burgh.105  Ultimately, though, judi-
cial development under this doctrine was halted by the Court of Ses-
sion’s holding in Dyce v. Hay that a community right of recreation
could not be claimed by a burgh community on land outside the burgh
that was not in any way connected to the burgh or its inhabitants and
was owned by a third party.106
Even though some Scottish courts recognized that a right to play
golf could constitute a servitude,107 sanctioning a generalized right of
101. Id. at 214–15.
102. Id. at 219–20.
103. Id. at 208–20, 228–32.
104. Home v. Young, (1846) 9 D. 286, 300–04 (Scot.).  In this complex case, the legal
factor of the estate of  the superior of Eyemouth (a burgh of barony) sued five
impoverished women who lived in Eyemouth to establish an exclusive claim of
property to the superior’s land unencumbered from any servitude of bleaching of
linen, washing of clothes, or drawing of water.  The women all leased, rather than
owned, their houses and therefore could not point to a dominant tenement for
purposes of establishing a servitude under Scottish law.  Because the community
was only a burgh of barony, and not a royal burgh, it was not “infeft” of any land,
and thus the burgh itself could not provide a dominant tenement upon which to
base a servitude. Id. at 286–89.
105. Id. at 297–303.  For a detailed discussion of Home v. Young, see Jarman, supra
note 100, at 209–10, 222–23.
106. Dyce v. Hay, (1849) 11 D. 1266, 1272 (Scot.). Dyce concerned the assertion of a
right to recreation on the land of Lady James Hay that lay between a footpath
and the River Don outside of the burgh of barony of Old Aberdeen and which was
claimed on behalf of the inhabitants of Aberdeen and other burghs and villages in
the vicinity. Id. at 1266–67.
107. See Magistrates of Earlsferry v. Malcolm, (1829) 7 S. 755, 756–57 (Scot.), aff’d,
(1832) 11 S. 74 (Scot.) (holding that a royal burgh could claim a servitude of golf-
ing on land owned by neighboring proprietor); see also Dempster v. Cleghorn,
(1813) 3 Eng. Rep. 780, 785–86 (appeal taken from Scot. Sess.) (recognizing a
servitude of golf claimed to prevent the buyer of burgh land from keeping a rabbit
warren on the famous links at St. Andrews).  This St. Andrews decision of the
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recreational access was simply a step too far, even under the poten-
tially flexible doctrine of community rights.108  The decision in Dyce v.
Hay was a key turning point.  It marked a “conservative backlash”
against a liberalizing view toward community uses and an emerging,
but politically well-connected, access movement that had proved will-
ing to engage in dramatic and galvanizing acts of property law break-
ing.109  After these test cases, except in the special arena of golf,
Scottish courts continued to retreat from protecting asserted commu-
nity rights of recreation.110  In sum, Scottish courts’ failure to develop
the common law of public rights of way and community rights in ways
that would respond to the intensifying demand for public recreational
access was a significant impetus for seeking legislative reform in the
form of the LRSA.
B. The Law of Trespass
If public rights of way and community rights failed to serve the
access aspirations of the Scottish public, there was hardly any more
satisfaction with the law of trespass in Scotland prior to the passage of
the LRSA.  Not only did many Scots consistently question the exis-
tence of a law of trespass in Scotland, but just as important,  the tres-
pass law that did exist was difficult and often impractical to enforce.
In the late nineteenth century, the remarkable late Victorian ju-
rist, historian, political commentator, social reformer, and Liberal pol-
itician James Bryce introduced no less than twelve bills in the British
Court of Session was later reversed and remitted by the House of Lords. Id. at
787–89.  For more on the St. Andrews case, see Andrea C. Loux, The Great Rabbit
Massacre—A “Comedy of the Commons”? Custom, Community and Rights of Pub-
lic Access to the Links of St . Andrews, 22 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 123 (2000).
108. As one contemporary commentator puts it, “[a]side from the game of golf, the
judiciary [as reflected by the opinions of the majority in Dyce] viewed recreational
uses generally as too insignificant to be the object of legal rights.”  Jarman, supra
note 100, at 228.
109. Id. at 222–29 (describing how some of the key legal actors in Dyce had been in-
volved in earlier cases such as Torrie v. Duke of Athol, (1849) 2 D. 328 (Scot.), a
staged confrontation over a disputed road, and the 1822 case of Thomas Harvie in
which a crowd blew up an obstruction placed by a landowner on a footpath that
ran along the River Clyde in Glasgow).  For a detailed discussion of the creative
and often inspiring impact of property law breaking on the development of prop-
erty law in the United States, see Eduardo Pen˜alver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property
Outlaws, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 1095, 1104–40 (2007).
110. Compare Harvey v. Lindsey, (1853) 15 D. 768, 774–76 (Scot.) (granting interdict
to proprietrix to prevent villagers from skating, curling, and sliding on frozen
loch within her private, enclosed grounds because villagers’ use was too “occa-
sional and accidental” to be declared a servitude), with Sanderson v. Lees, (1859)
22 D. 24, 27–28 (Scot.) (recognizing right of inhabitants of Musselburgh to use
“whole ground” on which a golf course was situated and to prevent magistrates of
burgh from selling the land).
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Parliament seeking to secure rights to access to land in Scotland.111
Bryce’s legislative initiatives came in response to private landowners’
and tenants’ attempts to restrict access to estates or shut down what
were perceived to be existing public rights of way.112  In the parlia-
mentary debates, Bryce asserted that there had always been a com-
mon law right of access to land in Scotland, at least for purposes of
“recreation and scientific or artistic study.”113
Bryce was not alone in fostering this egalitarian view toward land
access.  An important contemporary of Bryce’s, Graham Murray, the
Solicitor General for Scotland and later Lord President of the Court of
Session, once suggested that “in Scotland there is not in any true
sense a law of trespass at all.”114  Several other members of Parlia-
ment and commentators expressed similar views.115  A century later,
in the debates preceding the passage of the LRSA, a new generation of
Scots continued to assert that Scotland recognized a right of access to
privately owned land at least for recreational purposes.116
Despite the frequency of these denials of the existence of trespass,
the weight of authority is clearly against the access advocates.  Histor-
ical sources, judicial opinions, and almost all contemporary Scottish
legal academics agree that landowners in Scotland always enjoyed an
exclusive right to control access to their lands, absent some other le-
gally recognized right, and thus could theoretically prohibit and sanc-
tion violations through the law of trespass.  In his influential treatise,
An Institute of the Law of Scotland in Four Books, published posthu-
mously in 1773, the late institutional writer John Erskine observed:
This right [of property] necessarily excludes every other person but the propri-
etor; for if another had a right to dispose of the subject, or so much as to use it,
without his consent, it would not be his property, but common to him with
that other.  Property therefore implies a prohibition, that no person shall
[e]ncroach upon the right of the proprietor; and consequently every
[e]ncroachment, though it should not be guarded against by statute, founds
111. Christopher Harvie, Bryce, James, Viscount Bryce (1838–1922), OXFORD DICTION-
ARY OF NAT’L BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32141?docPos=3
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010).  Bryce’s accomplishments are extraordinary.  He wrote
two immensely popular and influential books, The Holy Roman Empire and The
American Commonwealth, traveled the world, climbed mountains on many conti-
nents, served as Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, and finally, served as
the British Ambassador to the United States between 1907 and 1913.  Mount
Bryce in the Rocky Mountains is named after him. Id.
112. Tom Guthrie, Access Rights, in THE PROMISED LAND: PROPERTY LAW REFORM 125,
125 (Robert Rennie ed., 2008).
113. Id. at 127 (quoting from preamble to Bryce’s bills up through 1897).
114. Id. at 127 & n.14.
115. Id. at 127 n.15.
116. See Alan Blackshaw, Implied Permission and the Traditions of Customary Access,
3 EDIN. L.R. 368 (1999) (asserting the existence of a “long-standing general free-
dom in Scotland to take harmless responsible access to land not in cultivation
without any need to seek consent, and without trespass”).
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the proprietor in an action of damages.  But positive statute hath secured
property against several [e]ncroachments that most frequently happen, by in-
flicting special penalties on the trespasser . . . .117
Eighteen years later, Lord President Campbell stated in an often
quoted opinion that “[n]o man can claim a road or passage through
another man’s property, even for the purpose of going to church, with-
out a servitude, far less for amusement of any kind, however neces-
sary for health.”118  In his widely read and cited Principles of the Law
of Scotland, George Joseph Bell wrote that the “right of property” en-
compassed the right to prevent others from “setting foot upon” his
land or encroaching “however inoffensively” and that “[i]ndividual
benefit or convenience will not justify the invasion of the exclusive
right of property.”119  One hundred years later, Lord Trayner ob-
served that the “often expressed” notion that there was no law of tres-
pass in Scotland was “a loose and inaccurate one.”120  Finally, John
Rankine, one of the leading commentators on Scottish property law at
the end of the nineteenth century, flatly rejected the existence under
Scottish law of any kind of “jus spatiandi—a privilege of using the
surface of a landowner’s ground without express grant, for strolling
about, games, access for curling, [etc.]”121
Most contemporary observers agree that prior to the LRSA land-
owners in Scotland could invoke the law of trespass to exclude any
persons seeking access to their land without some private law or spe-
cial statutory right.  Indeed, several of the Scottish academic lawyers
most heavily involved in developing the LRSA concluded, based on ex-
tensive review of these and other authorities, that Scottish common
law had never recognized any so called “right to roam.”122  Other con-
117. 1 JOHN ERSKINE, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 151 (Edinburgh, John
Bell 1773).
118. Livingstone v. Earl of Breadalbane, (1791) 3 Pat. App. 221 (H.L.) 223 (appeal
taken from Scot.).  In this famous case, a Scottish laird of a Perthshire estate
brought an action for injunction and damages against an English gentleman who
came to Scotland for a hunting holiday, acquired a hunting license, and pro-
ceeded to shoot game on the proprietor’s unenclosed estate for several days with-
out permission.  The House of Lords affirmed Lord President Campbell’s view,
holding that under the law of Scotland, even though wild game was res nullius,
no person was entitled to enter a proprietor’s unenclosed land for purposes of
shooting game, and a proprietor was entitled to bar anyone from entering his
land. Id. at 221.
119. GEORGE JOSEPH BELL, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND §§ 943–44, at 424
(Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 6th ed. 1872) (1829).  Bell went on to stress that any
right to invade or use the property of another must be purchased. Id. § 944, at
424.  Moreover, Bell’s understanding that a landowner could avail himself of cer-
tain trespass remedies is confirmed by his discussion of permissible and imper-
missible means of self-help “to detain a trespasser.” Id. § 961, at 428–29.
120. Wood v. N. British Ry. Co., (1899) 2 F. 1, 2 (Scot.).
121. JOHN RANKINE, THE LAW OF LAND-OWNERSHIP IN SCOTLAND 322–33 (4th ed. 1909).
122. Rowan-Robinson & Ross, supra note 92, at 226.
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temporary Scottish property law scholars not involved in the debate
surrounding the LRSA concur.123
Still, what makes the law of trespass in Scotland problematic—and
perhaps what accounts for so many Scots’ dismissive attitude toward
it—is the difficulty that landowners and others face in enforcing the
right to exclude.  The practical limitations on enforcement stem from
several doctrinal conditions.  First, and most tellingly, trespass in
Scotland is primarily viewed as constituting a tort, assuming there is
damage, and is generally not considered to be a crime.124  Prior to the
LRSA, a trespasser would be subject to criminal sanction only in ex-
ceptional situations: for instance, when the trespasser was also caught
poaching game,125 overnight camping,126 New Age traveling or partic-
ipating in a “rave,”127 or engaging in hunting sabotage.128
More significantly, although trespass can in principle be inter-
dicted (enjoined), this remedy can be difficult to obtain and of limited
value for a number of reasons.  At the outset, a proprietor cannot prac-
tically obtain an interdict against the public at large, because an in-
terdict is only available if the identity of the trespasser is known.129
In addition, there must be a reasonable likelihood of trespass occur-
ring in the future before an interdict will issue.130  Thus, a proprietor
usually must establish evidence not only of past trespass,131 but also,
at least according to some decisions, that a trespasser has failed to
heed proper warnings.132  Finally, for an interdict to be available, the
123. See 1 WILLIAM M. GORDON & SCOTT WORTLEY, SCOTTISH LAND LAW ¶ 13-09, at
399–400 (3d ed. 2009) (rejecting the notion that there is no law of trespass in
Scotland); GRETTON & STEVEN, supra note 80, at 253 (same); REID, supra note 71,
¶ 180 (defining trespass as “temporary or transient intrusion into land owned or
otherwise lawfully possessed by someone else” and noting that both slight intru-
sion and harmless intrusion can constitute trespass, although these latter intru-
sions may not be easily remedied).
124. GRETTON & STEVEN, supra note 80, at 254; see also GORDON & WORTLEY, supra
note 123, ¶ 13-09, at 400 (explaining that what is most often meant by saying
that there is no law of trespass in Scotland is that “trespass is not a crime at
common law”).
125. Game (Scotland) Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 68, §§ 1–3, 5 (criminalizing poaching
activities during daytime and establishing fines and forfeiture of game as penal-
ties); Night Poaching Act, 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 69, § 1 (same for night-time poaching
and allowing incarceration for up to three or six months as penalty, depending on
number of offenses).
126. Trespass (Scotland) Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 56, § 3.
127. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, §§ 61–62.
128. See id. §§ 68– 69.
129. REID, supra note 71, ¶ 183.
130. Magistrates of Inverurie v. Sorrie, (1956) S.C. 175, 179–80 (Scot.); Hay’s Trs. v.
Young, (1877) 4 R. 398, 400–02 (Scot.).
131. Warrand v Watson, (1905) 8 F. 253, 262 (Scot.).
132. Cf. Paterson v. M’Pherson, (1917) 33 Sh. Ct. Rep. 237, 239–41 (Scot.) (denying
interdict because defender fenced in his sheep after being notified of single inci-
dent of his sheep straying onto and grazing on neighbor’s farm).
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trespass must be non-trivial.  In the leading case, Winans v.
Macrae,133 concerning an alleged trespass by a crofter’s pet lamb onto
a neighboring 200,000 acre estate, the court made it clear that inter-
dicts will generally not be awarded for de minimis trespasses that do
not threaten any demonstrable or “appreciable wrong.”134  All of these
practical limitations led one late nineteenth century landowner to
complain:
This power [to apply for interdict] is never exercised and is perfectly useless,
as the tourist or botanist does not intend going up the mountain a second
time, and if he did, the expense and trouble attending the application would
be out of all proportion to the advantage gained, seeing that a fresh batch of
visitors might be expected the very next day.135
When a landowner sues for damages in lieu of or in addition to an
injunction, another doctrinal limitation comes into play.  In a leading
late nineteenth century decision, Lord Ormidale clearly implied that
an innocent or good faith intruder would not be liable for trespass,
suggesting that liability for this tort is not strict.136  Contemporary
authorities concur, pointing out that monetary liability for trespass
depends on a finding of fault.137  In conclusion, unless a landowner
apprehends a trespasser in the act of trespassing and can use some
reasonable means of self-help to escort him off the premises,138 a Scot-
133. (1885) 12 R. 1051 (Scot.).
134. Id. at 1063 (Lord Young).  Thus, it might be said that Scotland lacks a robust
expressive remedy for trespass similar to the punitive damage award affirmed by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court for intentional, but economically harmless, tres-
pass in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).  However,
Professor Kenneth Reid reports that “interdict has frequently been granted with-
out averments of injury.” REID, supra note 71, ¶ 183 (citing Brown v. Lee Constr.
Ltd., (1977) S.L.T. (Notes) 61, 61 (Scot.)).  In Brown, however, there was at least
the potential for injury, as the trespass consisted of a tower crane’s “jib” passing
over the petitioner’s garden for a lengthy period of construction on the neighbor-
ing property.  (1977) S.L.T. (Notes) at 61.
135. Cameron of Lochiel, Letter to the Editor, TIMES (London), Mar. 10, 1892, quoted
in Guthrie, supra note 112, at 129.
136. Hay’s Trs. v. Young, (1877) 4 R. 398, 401 (Scot.) (finding not liable for interdict a
plumber who dug holes without proprietor’s permission in order to trace an old
drain to obtain evidence for another legal proceeding because he acted in good
faith).
137. See REID, supra note 71, ¶ 185; see also Harvie v. Turner, (1916) 32 Sh. Ct. Rep.
267, 268–69 (Scot.) (finding defender’s liability for trespass damage founded on
contemptuous failure to take precautions in face of repeated warnings about his
bull trespassing onto neighbor’s property and serving cows).  Despite the holding
in Harvie, Scottish courts are generally more likely to place the onus of prevent-
ing animal trespass on landowners on the theory that it is easier for them to
enclose their land than for animal owners to keep their stock under constant con-
trol and supervision. GRETTON & STEVEN, supra note 80, at 255–56.  On straying
animals generally, see REID, supra note 71, ¶¶ 186–89.
138. In Bell v. Shand, (1870) 7 S.L.R. 267, 267–68 (Scot.), a landowner was held not
liable for assault for dragging rather roughly by the coat collar a fifteen-year-old
boy who the landowner had caught poaching.  Of course, preventive measures
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB403.txt unknown Seq: 26 21-JUL-11 12:36
764 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:739
tish landowner’s remedies are limited, particularly when confronted
by isolated acts of trespass unaccompanied by damage.139
Notwithstanding the doctrinal limitations of the law of trespass,
the repeated assertions by laymen and some lawyers that Scotland
lacked a law of trespass at all and that there existed some generalized
right of recreational access across privately owned land certainly re-
main significant despite their descriptive inaccuracy.  These frequent
assertions, reiterated in the press, in conversation, and occasionally
even in learned journals,140 helped establish a kind of customary ex-
pectation of access, or perhaps an implicit social obligation norm im-
posed on landowners, that helped smooth the way for legislative
action.
C. Access by Express or Implied Permission
Two other means of providing public access to private land deserve
brief mention before we explore the emergence of the LRSA.  First, it
is always possible for landowners to provide express permission to
persons seeking to gain access to their land for some kind of recrea-
tional or educational activity.  If this occurs, the access taker is, by
definition, not trespassing.141  Prior to the enactment of the LRSA,
some landowners in Scotland no doubt had entered into express li-
cense agreements with persons seeking access for these or similar pur-
poses.  Although it is impossible to know exactly how many
agreements like this may have existed, there is no evidence to suggest
they were widespread.142
Another consensual means of providing access rights occurs under
the common law doctrine of implied permission or consent.  This may
be what some of the access advocates in the years preceding the LRSA
were describing when they claimed that Scotland did not have a com-
like building walls and fences are normally the preferred means of self-help. See
Winans v. Macrae, (1885) 12 R. 1051, 1064 (Scot.); REID, supra note 71, ¶ 184.
139. REID, supra note 71, ¶ 182.
140. See Blackshaw, supra note 116.
141. REID, supra note 71, ¶ 181.
142. Pursuant to one such agreement that did occur, however, the owner of the large
Assynt estate in the Highlands guaranteed free access to the public, along with
sympathetic conservation management, in exchange for favorable inheritance tax
treatment. AUSLAN CRAMB, WHO OWNS SCOTLAND NOW? 39 (1996).  Yet, another
notable agreement, the Concordat on Access (1996), signed by the Scottish Land-
owners’ Federation, was clearly not a grant of express permission for the public to
enjoy freedom of access, but rather just a statement of the signatories’ intent to
promote certain principles among its members.  Rowan-Robinson & Ross, supra
note 92, at 228.  A third agreement, the Letterewe Accord, that preceded the Con-
cordat is somewhere in between.  Co-written by the wife of the owner of a large
estate in Western Ross and the leader of the Rambler’s Association, it provided a
general right to roam but imposed some restrictions on access in deer stalking
season. CRAMB, supra at 54–55.
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mon law of trespass.  Although it is certainly true that many Scottish
landowners, particularly in more remote areas, often looked the other
way and impliedly granted permission to walkers and hikers who
passed across their land, the nature and scope of the resulting public
rights always remained vague.143
The basic limitation in this area of the law, Professors Jeremy
Rowan-Robinson and Andrea Ross explain, is that even if an access
taker can prove to a court the principal elements of an implied consent
claim,144 the resulting implied permission is still quite “precarious”
because a landowner can always withdraw consent at any time.145
Thus, although implied consent can be a defense to a trespass action,
once a landowner changes his mind and erects barriers to entry, en-
gages in other forms of self-help, or perhaps even initiates legal pro-
ceedings, implied consent will not avail those seeking to regain access.
It is easy to imagine how this unhappy situation would arise as land-
ownership changes hands more frequently, absentee ownership be-
comes more common, or more intensive land exploitation activities are
undertaken, phenomena that were all clearly underway in Scotland in
the decades preceding the LRSA.146
143. In fact, two scholars who attempted to penetrate and systematize this branch of
the law concluded that it “gives rise to very considerable difficulty.”  Rowan-
Robinson & Ross, supra note 92, at 228.
144. Rowan-Robinson and Ross discerned three requirements for establishing implied
permission for access to land: (1) the landowner’s knowledge that access is being
habitually taken; (2) no serious attempts by the landowner to prevent access; and
(3) an objective belief by the person taking access that permission is being given.
Id. at 230–32.  These authors found that there were basically two branches of
judicial decisions that suggested some form of implied consent for permission to
be on the land of another in Scotland.  One branch involved cases of permanent
encroachment by buildings or constructions, an area of little relevance to the
LRSA. Id. at 228.  The second, more significant, but still unreliable branch of
decisions date from the first half of the 1900s and concern the liability of land-
owners for personal injury to persons (particularly children) who wandered onto
their land. Id. at 228–29.  As Rowan-Robinson and Ross explain, courts’ reluc-
tance to declare victims “trespassers” in these cases probably stemmed more from
a desire to avoid altering the principles of occupiers liability law and landowners’
duty of care than from any real desire to provide formal recognition of implied
recreational access rights. Id.
145. Id. at 232.
146. See W. David H. Sellar, The Great Land Debate and the Land Reform (Scotland)
Act 2003, 60 NORSK GEOGRAFISK TIDSSKRIFT [NOR. J. GEOG.] 100, 101 (2006) (re-
porting on the increasing commodification of Scottish land in the international
marketplace, and the increasing likelihood that large landowners in Scotland
were absentee and foreign); see also CRAMB, supra note 142, at 26–28 (listing top
twenty landowners in Scotland by size of estate and major foreign landowners in
Scotland); ANDY WIGHTMAN, WHO OWNS SCOTLAND 164 tbl.9, 165 tbl.10 (1996)
(listing the twenty-five largest overseas landowners and the top ten investment
landowners in Scotland respectively).
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The conclusion of Scottish Natural Heritage, a respected quasi-au-
tonomous non-governmental organization (QUANGO) that examined
the entire landscape of public access law in Scotland in 1998 and that
played a crucial consensus-building role prior to the passage of the
LRSA, was accurate when it observed that no one was particularly
happy with the status quo in Scotland.  Landowners faced “difficulty
in protecting their interests in the face of irresponsible or provocative
behaviour by the public.”147  In addition, the existing law of public ac-
cess was neither clear to members of the public seeking access nor
particularly protective of their interests in access.148  To understand
how this situation was transformed, though, we must now consider
how a new consensus on access arrangements was forged in England
and Wales, and then in Scotland.
IV. TWO PATHS TO EXPANDED PUBLIC ACCESS
To appreciate the novelty of the LRSA as a matter of institutional
design, it helps to consider the Countryside and Rights of Way Act
2000 (CRoW Act), the access legislation that the British Parliament
enacted a decade ago for England and Wales.  Although the CRoW Act
has been discussed in property law literature in the United States and
abroad,149and is significant in its own right because it enshrines “a
generali[z]ed right of self-determining pedestrian access to open land”
that the English common law could never recognize,150 the CRoW Act
is, as Part V will show, decidedly less ambitious than the LRSA.151  To
understand how these different institutional approaches emerged,
this Part contrasts the origins of the CRoW Act in England and Wales
with the preliminary studies and consensus building that occurred in
Scotland prior to passage of the LRSA.  This Part thus shows how
these different historical experiences yielded different kinds of access
legislation.
147. ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 99, at 7.
148. Id. at 7–8.
149. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 811–12 (7th ed. 2010); KEVIN GRAY
& SUSAN FRANCIS GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW 1372–76 (5th ed. 2009); AJ VAN
DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS 193–95 (2009); Jerry L. Anderson, Country-
side Access and Environmental Protection: An American View of Britain’s Right to
Roam, 9 ENVTL. L. REV. 241 (2007) [hereinafter Anderson, Countryside Access];
Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle
of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375 (2007) [hereinafter Anderson, Right to
Roam].
150. GRAY & GRAY, supra note 149, at 1372; see also Kevin Gray, Pedestrian Democ-
racy and the Geography of Hope, 1 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 45, 49–52 (2010) (detail-
ing why a universal right to roam was inconceivable under English common law).
151. GRAY & GRAY, supra note 149, at 1372; VAN DER WALT, supra note 149, at 194;
Rowan-Robinson, supra note 98, at 1394.
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A. Origins of the CRoW Act in England and Wales
The demand for some kind of legally recognized right to roam over
open country in England and Wales has its origins in the loss of com-
mon access and use rights that took place during the centuries-long
enclosure movement.152  Under the common rights system that was
extinguished by the enclosure movement, commoners enjoyed a wide
assortment of use rights in land technically owned by a feudal lord.153
Thus, an otherwise landless villager or commoner who had common
rights might have been entitled to graze some animals on a common
pasture, gather wood or turf on a manor’s “wastelands,” or let his pigs
and geese glean the remains of a harvested field.154  Starting in the
late sixteenth century, but with increasing frequency between 1700
and the mid-1800s, private enclosure agreements and literally
thousands of acts of Parliament extinguished these “commons”
rights.155
While this is not the place to review the historiographic and theo-
retical debates over the causes, consequences, and fairness of the en-
closure movement, one thing seems clear: at the end of the period of
enclosure, English property law had moved from what Stuart Banner
has described as at least a partially “functional” system of property
rights, in which many different individuals might have rights to use a
particular parcel of land, to a purely “spatial” system of absolute own-
ership of specific land.156  In the latter there is little or no room for a
generalized right of public access, even for purposes of recreation and
passage.  By the beginning of the twentieth century, it was clear that
members of the public did not enjoy a general right of access over pri-
vate land unless such a right had been granted by the owner or by
statute.157
152. See Gray, supra note 150, at 49 (noting that although a “golden age” of access
may have existed in medieval England, in which something like a right to roam
over uncultivated land was recognized, “any entitlement of this kind was gradu-
ally extinguished, from the 16th century onwards, by the enclosure movement”).
See generally Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 383–89.
153. Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 383.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 383–84; see also MARION SHOARD, A RIGHT TO ROAM 97–110 (1999) (elabo-
rating on transition from medieval land ownership patterns to feudalism and en-
closure movement).  For a comprehensive study of the system of common rights
that the enclosure movement tore down and the social, political and economic
effects of enclosure, see J.M. NEESON, COMMONERS: COMMON RIGHT, ENCLOSURE
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND, 1700–1820 (1993).
156. Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359,
S365–68 (2002); see Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 389–90.  As
Banner points out, though, the allocation of property rights in pre-enclosure En-
gland was not purely functional; plenty of land was divided spatially as well.
Banner, supra, at 366.
157. ANGELA SYDENHAM, PUBLIC RIGHTS OF WAY AND ACCESS TO LAND 196–97 (2001).
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Yet, as Jerry Anderson explains, there was some suppleness in the
property rights system that emerged out of the enclosure movement.
In addition to their use rights, members of the public had also enjoyed
the right to walk or ride over the commons or wastelands that be-
longed to landlords for purposes of traveling from one village to an-
other or to other important places of congregation like mills, churches,
or the coast.158  The routes the commoners used most frequently de-
veloped over time into footpaths and bridleways.159  Much like public
rights of way in Scotland, these footpaths and bridleways eventually
were recognized in English law as public easements over private land,
but just as in Scotland, these public easements only provided for ac-
cess along a particular and defined route and did not provide a genera-
lized right of access or right to roam.160  Because these footpaths and
other public ways were often the primary means of transportation be-
tween villages and other places people needed to go, they became rela-
tively widespread in England and Wales, covering, according to some
estimates, over 130,000 linear miles.161
The first major legislative break from the spatial system that
emerged at the end of the enclosure movement came with the Law of
Property Act in 1925.162  Appearing during the interwar period when
the British outdoor movement began to gain momentum and popular-
ized the notion that healthy open air pursuits were a valuable public
good, this landmark legislation established public rights of access for
the purposes of “air and exercise” to what was considered “common
land” in certain urban and metropolitan districts in England and
Wales and in some rural areas like the popular Lake District of north-
west England and parts of South Wales.163  Today, this legislation
158. Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 381; see also NEESON, supra note
155, at 171–72, 194 (describing how commoners enjoyed various forms of recrea-
tional access, for “walking, looking, and being” and playing football, over open
fields and commons in the common right system).
159. Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 383.
160. Id. at 380.  Anderson details the various means by which these public easements
were recognized under English law.  “Sometimes the special commissioners ap-
pointed under an enclosure act would explicitly include a public right of way in
their award.” Id. at 390.  More often, the doctrines of prescription and implied
dedication were used, both of which required a twenty-year period of use. Id. at
390–91; see also SHOARD, supra note 155, at 15–19 (describing the current system
and regulation of footpaths and bridleways in England and Wales).
161. Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 381; see also SHOARD, supra note
155, at 17 (reporting that as of 1999, England and Wales had “101,416 miles of
public footpath, 21,450 miles of public bridleway, 4,590 miles of road used as pub-
lic path, and 2,267 miles of byway open to all traffic”).
162. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20 (Eng. & Wales).
163. Id. § 193; SYDENHAM, supra note 157, at 195.  This “common land” consists
merely of any land (typically privately owned) over which “commoners” tradition-
ally enjoyed specific use rights, such as the right to graze animals or collect wood,
the remnants of the pre-enclosure rights to the commons. SYDENHAM, supra note
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still protects the public’s right to be present on many small commons
and large open spaces in or near major cities.164
After World War II, another landmark act of Parliament, the Na-
tional Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 (NPACA), made
several significant contributions to public access in England and
Wales.165  First, it facilitated agreements between landowners and lo-
cal authorities and the promulgation of orders that led to approxi-
mately 50,000 hectares becoming open to the public.166  Second, and
more important, the Act committed each county council to conduct a
survey of existing public rights of way (the footpaths, bridleways, and
carriage ways discussed above) and to have them comprehensively
mapped.167  After initial surveys were completed and landowners
were given an opportunity to appeal, definitive maps were published
which showed the location of now legally recognized public rights of
way.168  As a result of this mapping process, the NPACA produced, to
a much greater extent than in Scotland, a system of “systematically
confirmed public rights of way” and a procedure for resolving disputes
over controversial paths.169  In short, the NPACA created, as Jerry
Anderson puts it, some “certainty regarding the existence and location
of footpaths, which furthered the public’s confidence in using
them.”170
157, at 197; see also Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 383–85 (com-
menting on how enclosure affected commons rights and dismantled an efficient
and “complex system of land utilization”).  For a valuable discussion of the emer-
gence of the British outdoor movement in the interwar period, its ideology, and
how the movement intersected with other forces, such as mass trespass and ha-
bitual trespassing organized by the Ramblers’ Association and others, see Ben
Mayfield, Access to Land: Social Class, Activism and the Genealogy of the Coun-
tryside and Rights of Way Act, 31 STATUTE L. REV. 63, 66–71 (2010). See also
HARVEY TAYLOR, A CLAIM ON THE COUNTRYSIDE: A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH OUT-
DOOR MOVEMENT 1–16 (1997) (providing an overview of manifold forces that
shaped this movement).
164. SHOARD, supra note 155, at 25–26.
165. National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 97
(Eng. & Wales).
166. SHOARD, supra note 155, at 35–38; SYDENHAM, supra note 157, at 195.
167. Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 403.
168. Id.
169. Id.; see National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, 1949, 12, 13, 14 Geo. 6,
c. 97, §§ 46, 51–55, 107.  Periodic reviews of the conclusive maps were required,
and new rights of way could be established based on new information, but only
after compensating the landowner.  Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at
403; see also SHOARD, supra note 155, at 21 (contrasting the difference in both
extent and certainty of public footpaths and bridleways in England and Wales
versus public rights of way in Scotland and noting that in England and Wales the
average density of public paths is 2.2 miles of path per square mile of countryside
compared to 0.2 in Scotland).
170. Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 403.  Looking back at the 1949 Act,
Mayfield calls it “a clear antecedent to the Countryside and Rights of Way Act.”
Mayfield, supra note 163, at 73.  He also observes that it signaled Britain’s first
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In the 1950s and then again in the 1980s, various royal commis-
sions and reports recommended expansion of and greater legal protec-
tion for access rights on common land.171  Yet, landowner opposition
and the Conservative governments’ lack of interest yielded inac-
tion.172  It was only in 1997, with the election of the Labour Party led
by Tony Blair and other “New Labour” politicians who had committed
the party to broad conservation values and to increasing public access
to the open countryside, that momentum was regained.173
After first considering a voluntary approach to enhancing access
favored by the Conservative Party and landowner groups, the govern-
ment ultimately chose to promote compulsory access rights that gave
the public the right to “explore” the countryside and travel beyond es-
tablished paths or where landowners had granted permission.174  Af-
ter debate in both houses of Parliament, including significant
amendments in the House of Lords, the CRoW Act was passed and
received Royal Assent on November 30, 2000.175  As we shall see, a
considerable amount of implementation work—the mapping of statu-
torily defined CRoW “access land”—still had to be accomplished even
after this momentous change.176
comprehensive commitment to protection of the countryside and the public’s
rights to enjoy its beauty and that, much as with the Law of Property Act in 1925,
this legislation followed soon after the conclusion of a world war when the British
public felt its wartime sacrifices should be rewarded with greater public access to
the land which had helped inspire much of that wartime sacrifice. Id. at 71–73.
171. See Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 398–400, 402–03.
172. SYDENHAM, supra note 157, at 195.
173. SHOARD, supra note 155, at 5–7; SYDENHAM, supra note 157, at 195.  As Mayfield
notes, the 1997 Labour Party manifesto which promised wider access to land in
Britain reflected a mixture of “New Labour” values including conservation, envi-
ronmental awareness, and concerns about public heath, rather than just the
traditional class consciousness associated with “old Labour.”  Mayfield, supra
note 163, at 75–76.
174. SHOARD, supra note 155, at 7; SYDENHAM, supra note 157, at 195–96; Mayfield,
supra note 163, at 79–80.  The British government performed an extensive
cost–benefit analysis of the basic options for achieving greater public access to
the countryside before deciding upon the compulsory legislation option.  For a
summary of this analysis, see DEPT. OF ENV’T, TRANSP., & REGIONS, APPRAISAL OF
OPTIONS ON ACCESS TO THE OPEN COUNTRYSIDE OF ENGLAND AND WALES 13–27
(1999).
175. SYDENHAM, supra note 157, at 200.
176. See Open Access Land, RAMBLERS, http://www.ramblers.org.uk/freedom/rightor
oam/latestdevelopments.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (noting that the mapping
process established under the CRoW Act was finally completed on October 31,
2005).
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B. Historical Memory, Preliminary Studies, and Consensus
Building in Scotland
Scotland’s recent experience leading up to its breakthrough in ac-
cess legislation was noticeably different than England and Wales’ ex-
perience preceding the CRoW Act.  To a much greater extent than in
England and Wales, the motivation for land reform in Scotland was
marked not just by unhappiness with the amount of legally protected
public access to the outdoors but also by Scots’ broader dissatisfaction
with both the distribution and nature of landownership itself in Scot-
land.177  This dissatisfaction transcended the technical deficiencies in
the law regarding public rights of way, trespass, and implied consent
described in Part II.  Moreover Scots responded to this general dissat-
isfaction and to these technical problems with its existing access re-
gime with an unusually well organized and collaborative effort to
build consensus around the principles of a new access regime.  Finally,
the enthusiasm and national pride in Scotland that was produced by
constitutional devolution in the United Kingdom clearly played a deci-
sive role in enabling these common principles to flower in the form of
the LRSA.
Scots’ dissatisfaction with the state of landownership in their coun-
try had at least three different aspects.  First, and perhaps most fun-
damentally, in the decades preceding the LRSA many Scots
complained that ownership of the land in Scotland was concentrated
in a surprisingly small number of people and institutions.178  While
the vast majority of Scots live in the urban belt extending from Edin-
burgh to Glasgow and in several other scattered urban areas—namely
Aberdeen, Dundee, and Inverness—where landownership is relatively
diffused, it is undeniable that much of the rural and undeveloped land
in Scotland is held in large estates by a relatively small number of
private and public owners.179  Although the precise numbers may
vary depending on who is doing the counting, one critic of land owner-
ship patterns in Scotland reported that in 1970 just 1720 owners
owned more than twelve million (64.3%) of Scotland’s roughly
nineteen million acres and that by 1995 just 1411 owners owned
slightly more than eleven million acres (57.8%) of Scotland.180
177. Sellar, supra note 146, at 100–01.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. WIGHTMAN, supra note 146, 142–43, 157 tbl.1, 158 tbl.3; see also CRAMB, supra
note 142, at 12–28 (commenting on the elite status of large Scottish landowners
and how their view of Scottish property “as a sort of personal, sporting paradise”
results in a system that “benefit[s] the owner, fail[s] the environment, [and]
do[es] little for the community”); JOHN MCEWEN, WHO OWNS SCOTLAND? A STUDY
IN LAND OWNERSHIP 18–20 (Polygon 2d ed. 1981) (listing the names of major land-
owners in Scotland, the acreage of their estates, and where the estates are lo-
cated).  McEwen’s study was the first breakthrough in this field, and Wightman
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The second source of dissatisfaction with land ownership stems
from the fact that anyone can acquire and own land in Scotland, with-
out committing to live there, being a citizen of Scotland, or adhering to
any kind of community-based land management regime.181  The in-
creasingly frequent phenomena of absentee ownership, whether by
the archetypical English grandee who visits his sporting estate in
Scotland a few weeks each year or the more contemporary example of
the Arab sheik, Dutch or Danish business tycoon, or English rock star
who buys a Scottish estate for the prestige, contributed to the sense
that Scottish land was becoming just another object of desire, in effect
a commodity available on the international marketplace.182
Finally, there was a profound historical sense that many Scots had
been unjustly evicted from their ancestral land as a result of what is
known as the “Highland Clearances,” the process through which small
customary agricultural tenants, often called “crofters,” were cleared
from their landholdings to make way for agricultural improvement,
especially large sheep farms, in the late eighteenth and much of the
nineteenth centuries.183  Much like the English enclosure movement,
the causes and consequences of the Clearances have been debated at
length in Scottish historiography.184  What is more important for our
purposes, though, is the extent to which the plight of the crofters and
their frequent law-breaking resistance to the Clearances was popular-
ized and romanticized through poetry, fiction, and popular history and
relies on it extensively, though he made corrections and improvements to
McEwen’s numbers. See WIGHTMAN, supra note 146, at 147, 158 tbls. 2 & 3.  Be-
cause of the absence of an official land registry at the time, McEwen and his
collaborators engaged in a painstaking process of collecting data using index
cards and estate boundaries marked on ordinance survey maps. McEwen, supra,
at 6–7.  Cramb reports that as of 2000 the powerful Scottish Landowners’ Federa-
tion consisted of approximately 4000 members, and their membership accounted
for about 80% of the land in Scotland. CRAMB, supra note 142, at 19.
181. CRAMB, supra note 142, at 18–20; Sellar, supra note 146, at 101.
182. Cramb’s presentation of the contemporary state of land ownership in Scotland
today dramatically illustrates this concern over commoditization as he shows
that large landowners today run the gamut from the traditional “self-perpetuat-
ing e´lite, educated at Eton/Harrow and Oxford/Cambridge, pursuing careers in
London” to self-made rock stars like “Paul McCartney, Genesis, and Ian Ander-
son of Jethro Tull,” not to mention pension funds, insurance companies, and envi-
ronmental groups. CRAMB, supra note 142, at 12, 17, 21; see also WIGHTMAN,
supra note 146, at 147–50, 164 tbl.9, 165 tbl.10 (offering a dispassionate account
of “overseas interests,” including the curious case of large numbers of Danish in-
dividuals and corporations and “investment owners”).
183. Sellar, supra note 146, at 101.
184. For comprehensive and balanced studies of the entire social and economic history
of the Clearances, including peasant resistance, see ERIC RICHARDS, THE HIGH-
LAND CLEARANCES: PEOPLE, LANDLORDS AND RURAL TURMOIL (2005) and T.M. DE-
VINE, THE SCOTTISH NATION: 1700–2007, 124–50, 413–47 (2006).
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thus entered into Scottish national consciousness.185  Regardless of
the complex economic and social factors that produced these events,
the Clearances have become synonymous in Scottish historical mem-
ory with a story of loss, dispossession, and resistance that helped fuel
the political drive for radical land reform at the end of the twentieth
century, the precise moment when Scotland finally regained its own
Parliament and a much greater degree of political and law making
independence.186  This bitter yet proud historical memory combined
with Scots’ growing dissatisfaction with the state of land ownership in
Scotland to produce a powerful desire for legal change.
For actual change to occur, however, more than a convergence of
historical conditions was necessary.  The passage of actual legislation
required the contribution of many individuals and organizations
working to develop a consensus for an achievable platform of land re-
form that would feature enlarged public access as a key element.  One
organization that played a crucial role was the QUANGO known as
Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH).187  Another was the Access Forum,
a group designed to work in a collaborative manner to represent not
only land management interests but also recreational interests and
the public agencies that would eventually be involved in overseeing
any new access legislation.188  Building on an influential agreement
known as the Letterewe Accord, which had been negotiated in the
early 1990s between the Dutch owner of an 87,000 acre estate in the
Highlands and the head of the Ramblers’ Association and which had
provided for a generalized right of recreational access in exchange for
restrictions on access during deer-stalking season,189 the Access Fo-
rum took the lead in negotiating a critical document known as the
Concordat on Access to Scotland’s Hills and Mountains.190
185. Sellar, supra note 146, at 101–02; see also Pen˜alver & Katyal, supra note 109, at
1114–22 (discussing the expressive power of property law breaking through the
example of civil rights sit-ins in the American South during the 1960s).
186. Sellar, supra note 146, at 100–01.
187. Donna W. McKenzie Skene & Jeremy Rowan-Robinson, Access to the Scottish
Countryside: Proposals for Reform, 2001 JURID. REV. 95, 96–97.
188. Id. at 96.  Actually, the Access Forum is comprised of two separate fora: the Ac-
cess Forum proper, dealing with access to land, and the Access Forum (Inland
Water), which dealt with waterborne access. Id.  In practice, the two groups often
meet together and are thus referred to collectively as the Access Forum. Id.  Ac-
cording to reports, the Access Forum did actually work in a cooperative, non-
confrontational mode. Id.  Jeremy Rowan-Robinson served as Chairman of the
Access Forum. Id. at 95.
189. The Letterewe Accord was considered by many access groups and landowners to
be a blueprint for a non-legislative solution to the access problem. CRAMB, supra
note 142, at 54–55.  This accord was adopted by some neighboring (mainly Dutch-
owned) estates in Western Ross, but apparently not in large numbers elsewhere.
Id. at 54.
190. McKenzie Skene & Rowan-Robinson, supra note 187, at 96.
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Signed in 1996 by the Access Forum and the leadership of the Scot-
tish Landowner’s Federation, the Concordat signaled recognition by at
least some influential landowners of the principle of “freedom of access
exercised with responsibility and subject to reasonable constraints for
management and conservation purposes.”191  Access takers, for their
part, recognized “the needs of land management.”192  Although it was
perceived as a groundbreaking agreement, its scope was limited.  As
its title suggests, it only addressed access to hills and mountains and
left the issue of recreational access to lowlands and in-land water for
another day.  Additionally, it did not bind any members of that organi-
zation, or any other landowners for that matter, even though it was
signed by the convener of the Scottish Landowner’s Federation.  De-
spite its limitations, access enthusiasts in Scotland still viewed it as a
breakthrough because it signaled landowner acceptance of the notion
that there should be some kind of presumption in favor of recreational
access.193
Another crucial linchpin in the process leading to passage of the
LRSA was the election on May 1, 1997, of Britain’s Labour govern-
ment.  During its exile, the British Labour Party had committed itself
not only to constitutional devolution and greater access rights in En-
gland and Wales but also to initiate a study of the system of land own-
ership and management in Scotland.194  Consequently, as Donald
Dewar, then Secretary of State for Scotland, put it in 1998, “with the
advent of the Scottish Parliament, there will be for the first time a
real sustained opportunity to debate at Parliamentary level the poli-
cies which are right for Scotland.”195  Dewar’s remark captures a
widespread sentiment in Scotland that prior to devolution, the British
Parliament—especially large landowning interests that were well rep-
191. Elizabeth Buie, Protagonists Urged to Give ‘Ground-Breaking’ Concordat Chance






194. See SHOARD, supra note 155, at 6–7; Donna McKenzie Skene et al., Stewardship:
From Rhetoric to Reality, 3 EDIN. L. REV. 151, 152 (1999).
195. Rt. Hon. Donald Dewar, MP, Sec. of State for Scot., Fifth John McEwen Memorial
Lecture: Land Reform for the 21st Century (Sept. 4, 1998), available at http://
www.caledonia.org.uk/land/dewar.htm.  Dewar’s speech, given as the fifth John
McEwen Memorial Lecture in September 1998, is regarded as one of the defini-
tive statements of the case for land reform in Scotland and was given by the man
who was then Secretary of State for Scotland and would soon become Scotland’s
first First Minister after devolution was secured, and who was labeled by some
after his untimely death in 2000 as “the Father of the Nation.”  To understand
Dewar’s role in the long struggle for devolution, including the referenda that se-
cured its final implementation, see DEVINE, supra note 184, at 616–17, 631–32,
634–37.
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resented in the House of Lords—had blocked any serious considera-
tion of land reform in Scotland.196  Dewar also captured another
remarkable aspect of Scottish attitudes towards land reform at this
moment of constitutional restructuring.  Although Scots had become
increasingly concerned about the concentration of landownership in a
relatively small number of hands and about how under-investment in
land and neglectful land management had harmed rural communities,
devolution produced a surge of optimism in Scotland and a willingness
to move beyond vindictiveness.  As Dewar explained, “[w]e must not
use land reform to settle old scores. We must let the past go, and look
to the future.”197  So, when Queen Elizabeth II opened the Scottish
Parliament on July 1, 1999—for the first time since 1707—the stage
was set for profound change.
SNH, the other key consensus building entity, entered the scene
prominently after the newly elected Labor Party government asked it
to review the existing access arrangements for Scotland.198  By 2000,
relying in large part on previous work by the Access Forum, SNH com-
pleted and submitted to the Scottish Executive a draft “Access Code”
that introduced and explained the concept of “responsible access,”199 a
crucial element of the consensus compromise that would facilitate pas-
sage of the LRSA.  Meanwhile, back in 1998, drawing again on recom-
mendations of the Access Forum, SNH had published a major report,
Access to the Countryside for Open-Air Recreation,200 perhaps the sin-
gle most important pre-legislative document on access rights.  This re-
port set forth all of the key principles that had gained support among
interested parties during their years of meetings and that fundamen-
tally shaped the final bill that was adopted as the LRSA.201  Although
each of these principles helped the Scottish Executive to secure popu-
lar and legislative support for the draft bill it introduced in 2001,202
four were particularly crucial.
196. The remarks of various members of the Scottish Parliament on the final day of
debate on the Land Reform (Scotland) Bill, in January of 2003, attest to this
widespread belief.  23 Jan. 2003, SCOT. PARL. OFFICIAL REP., (2003) 14461–62,
14466, 14470, 14472 (Scot.), available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/
business/officialReports/meetingsParliament/or-03/sor0123-01.htm.
197. Dewar, supra note 195, at 8; see also Combe, supra note 5, at 196 (noting same
focus on the future, not the past).
198. McKenzie Skene & Rowan-Robinson, supra note 187, at 96.
199. Id. at 97.
200. ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 99.
201. See id. at 7, 16–17 (highlighting “four pillars” of the Access Forum’s recommenda-
tions and enumerating fifteen specific proposals that should structure a legisla-
tive package introducing a right of responsible access); McKenzie Skene &
Rowan-Robinson, supra note 187, at 96–97 (identifying five key elements of the
Access Forum’s proposals).
202. Land Reform: The Draft Bill was published as a consultation paper by the Scot-
tish Executive in February 2001.  McKenzie Skene & Rowan-Robinson, supra
note 187, at 95.
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This first principle—that there should be a broad right of non-mo-
torized, informal, recreational access to all land and inland water—
reflected a conscious decision to adopt a Scandinavian, as opposed to
an English, solution to the problem of public access rights.203  This
decision was motivated in part by the appreciation that Scotland was
relatively poorly provided with existing paths and public rights of
way, at least as compared with England and Wales,204 and partly by a
sense that previous legislation designed to improve access arrange-
ments had not been successful.  The insistence on providing access to
inland waters, canals, and the foreshore was motivated by the recogni-
tion that access to land and access to water are closely related and
recreational activities often take place “at the interface between land
and water.”205
The second principle—the notion that access should be contingent
on responsible exercise of access rights—was even more fundamental
because it helped to frame the upcoming public debate not so much on
the question of where people might go but on the question of how peo-
ple would or should behave when taking advantage of access rights.
Significantly and perhaps shrewdly, the eventual draft bill introduced
to the Scottish Parliament in 2001 did not define “responsible access,”
but instead listed various kinds of irresponsible behavior and merely
203. Indeed, the SNH–Access Forum reports contained a detailed discussion of access
arrangements in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany and referred to those
as a model for Scotland. See ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 99, at
29–30, 55–56.  While a detailed review of Scandinavian access rights is beyond
the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that several of the core principles that
emerged in the LRSA were found to exist in these Northern European systems.
Those include: (1) the idea that “property rights are often safeguarded through a
‘privacy zone’ around dwellings;” (2) “legislation often stipulates that users must
exercise due care and consideration and avoid damage or nuisance;” and (3)
“[c]omplex definitions are usually avoided.” Id. at 29.  For a detailed analysis of
Scandinavian access customs and legislation confirming the Scottish drafters’ sy-
nopsis, see generally Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Public Access to Private Land for
Walking: Environmental and Individual Responsibility as Rationale for Limiting
the Right to Exclude, 23 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
204. The Access Forum reported that while 15,000 kilometers of public access rights
had been claimed in Scotland and 84% of those had not been fully asserted or
vindicated, some 160,000 kilometers of rights of way existed in England, most of
which were “recorded on publically available maps.” ACCESS TO THE COUNTRY-
SIDE, supra note 99, at 25–26.  In Wales, there were 38,000 kilometers of rights of
way. Id. at 26.  Further, in England and Wales, a much higher proportion of
these rights of way were available for cycling and horseback riding than in Scot-
land. Id.  In addition, in England and Wales, the geographic spread of these
rights of way was more uniform across all areas, whereas in Scotland most of the
claimed rights of way were found in areas that only contained a small amount
(23%) of the country’s population. Id.
205. McKenzie Skene & Rowan-Robinson, supra note 187, at 99.  The report of the
Access Form is replete with details about the inadequacy of access rights to water
in Scotland. ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 99, at 24, 26.
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provided for the preparation and dissemination of an access code.206
This approach helped ease the passage of the Bill and indicated the
government’s confidence in the ability of average Scots to use the soft-
law tool of an access code to accommodate one another and respect the
interests of landowners.
The third principle—the proviso that any new statutory access
rights would contain safeguards to protect the privacy of countryside
residents and to protect legitimate land management interests—was
also instrumental in assuring that not all values associated with pri-
vate property ownership and exclusion rights would be lost under the
new statutory scheme.207  In other words, the document was careful to
signal that homeowners’ privacy interests and landowners’ interests
in making decisions about the uses to which their land is devoted
would be preserved as much as possible.
Finally, the fourth pillar of SNH’s report—the recommendation
that the government should provide additional resources to the public
bodies who would be tasked with implementing the new access system
and that the government should develop a significant education pro-
gram to inform the people of Scotland of their new access rights—
struck a tone of realism that may have helped persuade those who
were skeptical that a new property regime was practically achieva-
ble.208  These pragmatic suggestions about implementation acknowl-
edged that as significant a change in property arrangements as that
envisioned by the Access Forum and SNH would have unavoidable
costs that the government should bear.209
V. TWO VERSIONS OF ACCESS LEGISLATION CONTRASTED
Having traced the historical background of breakthrough access
legislation in England and Wales and in Scotland, we can now turn to
the details of the current statutory schemes.  As this Part demon-
strates, the LRSA creates an access right that is far wider in scope in
several important respects than that provided by the CRoW Act.
First, while the LRSA applies to almost all land and in-land water in
206. There was some unease over this decision as it was seen to open the door to po-
tential commercial access and to access for large group events.  McKenzie Skene
& Rowan-Robinson, supra note 187, at 100–01.
207. ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 99, at 7, 31–32.
208. Id. at 9, 31–32; McKenzie Skene & Rowan-Robinson, supra note 187, at 97.  In
fact, SNH estimated that as much as £10 million annually would be necessary to
establish and maintain the path networks needed for its vision of increased ac-
cess to the countryside to be realized. ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, supra note
99, at 9.
209. A final principle, reiterated in SNH’s report, was simply that all of the elements
described above should be incorporated into a “comprehensive” or “balanced”
package and not adopted piecemeal. ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 99,
at 6–7.
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Scotland, the CRoW Act only applies to a relatively small percentage
of land in England and Wales.  Moreover, the specific use-based excep-
tions to coverage are somewhat narrower in Scotland than in England
and Wales.  Second, the LRSA allows for a more extensive range of
access activities than the CRoW Act and thus provides the people of
Scotland with a fuller range of opportunities to engage their landscape
for recreation and education.  In short, it provides more potential for
human flourishing.  Third, the CRoW Act gives landowners greater
power to exempt their land from access rights and for longer periods of
time than does the LRSA.  Finally, while the CRoW Act remains loyal
to a boundary based understanding of ownership and exclusion, par-
ticularly when dealing with important subjects like how to protect the
privacy interests of homeowners and residential occupants and land
owner discretion to make changes that will affect access, the LRSA
embraces a more open-textured, standard-based regime that seeks to
inspire landowners and access takers to act virtuously or responsibly
toward one another.  In this sense, the LRSA represents a much more
ambitious attempt to create not just a narrow, boundary-based excep-
tion to the right to exclude but instead a potentially transformative,
new property regime based on a relationship between landowner and
access taker grounded in principles of reciprocity and mutual respect.
A. Land Subject to Access Rights
General Scope of Land Subject to Access: Let us first consider
what land is actually subject to public access rights.  Under the LRSA,
literally all land and inland water in Scotland is potentially subject to
the statutory access rights established in the legislation.210  Except
for several narrow subcategories of land over which access is “not ex-
ercisable,”211 persons can potentially exercise their right of responsi-
ble access anywhere in Scotland—in highland glens, on large and
small islands, on lochs and rivers, on wooded estates, and even in sub-
urban villages.  As recent judicial decisions have made clear, the
LRSA’s geographic reach is remarkably unlimited.212
In contrast to Scotland’s “universalist” approach to access, which
was modeled in part on Scandinavian conceptions of access rights, En-
gland and Wales chose to follow a “partialist” approach.213  This ap-
proach starts from a completely different presumption.  Rather than
declaring all land potentially subject to access rights, the CRoW Act
210. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 1(2)(a) (providing that “everyone”
has statutory rights to be “on land”); id. § 32 (defining land to include, among
other things, “inland waters,” canals, and “foreshore”).
211. See id. § 6; discussion infra notes 235–46 and accompanying text.
212. See Forbes v. Fife Council, (2009) S.L.T. 71 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.); discussion infra
notes 344–60 and accompanying text.
213. SHOARD, supra note 155, at 265–66.
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limits the reach of access rights to five specific categories of land that
are affirmatively designated as “access land.”214  Thus, in England
and Wales, the public’s “right to roam” only applies to these specific,
and sometimes overlapping, categories.  The first three categories are
all essentially defined by their physical characteristics.  These consist
of (1) mapped open country, (2) mountain land, and (3) coastal land.
“Mapped open country” refers to land that is shown on a conclusive
map issued by the appropriate “countryside body” as “open coun-
try.”215  “Open country” means land which “appears to the appropriate
countryside body to consist wholly or predominantly of mountain,
moor, heath or down, and is not registered common land.”216  While
most layman probably understand the terms “mountain, moor, heath
or down” to refer to the vast open highlands found in many parts of
the United Kingdom or the rough grazing land near the English and
Welsh coasts covered by grass or heather,217 the term has long been a
staple of British countryside legislation.218  Under the CRoW Act,
however, “mountain, moor, heath or down” is only defined in negative
terms to exclude land “which appears to the appropriate countryside
body to consist of improved or semi-improved grassland.”219  The gen-
eral idea seems to be that only land not subject to any kind of agricul-
ture or intensive grazing activity would be considered as access land.
Further, large categories of land in England and Wales, including ag-
ricultural fields, forests, and parkland, would presumably be ex-
214. Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, § 1(1) (Eng. & Wales);
SYDENHAM, supra note 157, at 201.
215. Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, § 1(1)(a) (Eng. & Wales).  The
appropriate countryside bodies for England and Wales respectively are the Coun-
tryside Agency and the Countrywide Council for Wales. Id. § 1(2).
216. Id. (emphasis added).
217. See SHOARD, supra note 155, at 63–76 (describing the physical condition of moun-
tain, moor, and rough grassland—i.e. heath and down—and public access to such
land prior to the CRoW act throughout the U.K.).
218. See SHOARD, supra note 155, at 30 (discussing use of these terms in the National
Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, as amended by the Countryside
Act 1968 and the Countryside (Scotland) Act 1967).  In an important consultation
paper, the British Department of Environment, Transport, and Regions (DETR)
defined “heath” as “characterized by the presence of dwarf shrubs such as
heather, gorse, cross-leaved heath, bilberry and crowberry.” DEP’T OF THE ENV’T,
TRANSP., & THE REGIONS, ACCESS TO THE OPEN COUNTRYSIDE IN ENGLAND AND
WALES § 3.5 (1998).  It defined “moor” to include “upland heath and grass,” and
noted its soils “usually have a peaty top” and that it is generally characterized by
semi-natural vegetation used as rough grazing.” Id. § 3.6.  Finally, it character-
ized “down” as “semi-natural grassland on shallow, lime-rich soils associated
with limestone escarpments” and that “often contains an exceptional diversity of
plants.” Id. § 3.7.  This agency estimated that in total “mountain, moor, heath
and down” would account for approximately 1,240,000 hectares or “about 8% of
the land area of England and Wales.” Id. § 3.8, tbl.1 at 38.
219. Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, § 1(2) (Eng. & Wales).
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cluded.220  The substantive work of delineating this primary category
of access land took place during a lengthy and costly process of provi-
sionally designating and mapping certain land as “open country,” fol-
lowed by a public comment and challenge process, before the maps
issued by the appropriate countryside agencies finally became conclu-
sive.221  This entire process of mapping “open country” and otherwise
implementing the “right to roam” was completed in 2005 and cost the
British government £69 million.222
The second category of access land, “mountain land,” is easier to
pin down.  It is simply land situated more than 600 meters above sea
level in an area for which a conclusive map has not been issued.223
This mountain land, though a subset of “open country,” thus qualified
immediately for access rights at the moment the CRoW Act became
law.  Mountains that are less than 600 meters above sea level are not
subject to public access unless and until they are shown on conclusive
maps as open country.224  Together, these two subcategories of land—
“open country” and “mountain land”—are the two most significant ad-
ditions made by the CRoW Act to the total area of land subject to pub-
lic access rights in England and Wales.
The CRoW Act also empowered the Secretary of State for England
and the National Assembly for Wales, subject to parliamentary ap-
proval, to extend the definition of open country to include “coastal
land,” meaning the foreshore or land adjacent to it, including any cliff,
bank, barrier, dune, beach, or flat.225  In 2009, the Marine and
Coastal Access Bill 2009 fulfilled that promise and now extends the
category of access land to include a “coastal margin,” that is, enough
land to provide a recreational route along the entire English coast.226
The final two categories of access land under the CRoW Act are
more technical in nature and not as extensive.  The first consists of
220. See SHOARD, supra note 155, at 49–63, 76–84 (describing physical condition and
restricted public access to such land prior to the CRoW Act).
221. Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 407–08.  For detailed maps, see
CRoW Access and Fire Severity Maps—Search, NATURAL ENGLAND, http://www.
openaccess.naturalengland.org.uk/wps/portal/oasys/maps/MapSearch (last vis-
ited Nov. 4, 2010).
222. Interviews with Rob Garner, Policy and Advice Officer, Scottish Natural Heri-
tage, in Edinburgh, Scot. (Sept. 22, 2009 & Dec. 18, 2009); see SELECT COMMITTEE
ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, THIRTY-SECOND REPORT, 2006-7, H.C., ¶ 11 (U.K.), availa-
ble at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmpubacc/
91/9107.htm.
223. Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, § 1(1)(d) (Eng. & Wales).
224. SYDENHAM, supra note 157, at 208.
225. Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, §§ 3, 44 (Eng. & Wales).
226. Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009, c. 23, §§ 296, 303 (Eng.); see GRAY & GRAY,
supra note 149, at 1376; Gray, supra note 150, at 65.  Once again, the process of
determining where exactly this coastal margin will be located will take years of
painstaking work.  The Act allows Wales to determine its own future for coastal
access.  Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009, c. 23, §§ 303, 310 (Eng.).
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“registered common land,” which includes land that had been specifi-
cally designated as common land under registers and maps under the
Commons Registration Act 1965 and whose registration had become
final under that act at the time of enactment of the CRoW Act 2000.227
The other is “dedicated land,” which includes land specifically “dedi-
cated” by private land owners (fee simple owners and leasehold own-
ers with at least ninety years left to run on their leases) as access
land.228  Notably absent from the categories of land subject to the
“right to roam” in England and Wales is inland water.  Thus, many
hundreds of miles of rivers, canals, and lakes are not subject to public
access in England and Wales.229
When all of the mapping required by the CRoW Act was complete,
the five categories of “access land” viewed together represented some-
where between 8% and 12% of all land in England and Wales.230
While this is certainly a significant expansion of the amount of land
available for public access compared to fifty years earlier,231 it still
pales in comparison to the amount of land potentially subject to re-
sponsible access in Scotland.
227. Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, §§ 1(1)(b), 1(3)(a) (Eng. & Wales).
In other words, if some land was already shown on an official map as registered
common land, it would automatically be deemed access land. SYDENHAM, supra
note 157, at 208.  Land which was “registered common land” when the CRoW Act
became law or becomes so registered thereafter will continue to be access land
even if it becomes deregistered. Id.; Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c.
37, § 1(3)(b) (Eng. & Wales).  In addition, access land will also include registered
common land in any area outside inner London for which a conclusive map relat-
ing to common land has not been issued. Id. § 1(1)(c).
228. Id. §§ 1(1)(e), 16.  Dedicating one’s land as “access land” is an irrevocable legal act
that binds successive owners and occupiers of the land but also provides certain
advantages, especially if there is de facto access to the land.  These advantages
include limiting the landowner’s or occupier’s tort liability to those who enter the
land, receipt of benefits created under local by-laws, and receipt of certain
wardening services. See id. §§ 13, 16; SYDENHAM, supra note 157, at 208–09.  The
tort liability protection is derived from the fact that a person entering “access
lands” is not treated as a “visitor,” but rather like a trespasser under the Occu-
pier’s Liability Act, and is deemed to assume risks relating to the natural fea-
tures of the landscape. Id. at 230-31; see Countryside and Rights of Way Act,
2000, c. 37, § 13 (Eng. & Wales).
229. SHOARD, supra note 155, at 86–95 (discussing access to inland water bodies in the
U.K. generally prior to CRoW Act); Rowan-Robinson, supra note 100, at 1396.
230. GRAY & GRAY, supra note 149, at 1373.  This is also the figure originally esti-
mated by the DETR in ACCESS TO THE OPEN COUNTRYSIDE IN ENGLAND AND
WALES, supra note 218, § 3.10.
231. In England alone, this massive mapping resulted in approximately 865,000 hect-
ares of land becoming subject to public access as defined in the Act, according to
Natural England, an independent organization that advises the government on
protecting the natural environment and encouraging outdoor recreation. See
Open Access Land, NATURAL ENGLAND, http://www.naturalengland.org.uk/our
work/enjoying/places/openaccess/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB403.txt unknown Seq: 44 21-JUL-11 12:36
782 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:739
Perhaps more important than the question of total acreage,
though, is the different methodology used to determine lands subject
to access under each regime.  As we have seen, the CRoW Act relies
essentially on mapping—on what Larissa Katz might call a boundary
drawing approach—to providing new access rights over land.232  Al-
though certain categories of land are exempted from the right to ex-
clude, the responsibility of determining new exclusion boundaries falls
on government experts to tell the public exactly where the economic
use of land is insignificant enough to justify limited forms of recrea-
tional access.  Put differently, England and Wales have chosen essen-
tially a “top down” approach,233 in which governmental ministers
exercise their expertise in designating certain land as suitable for ac-
cess under one of the designated categories and then translate those
designations into conclusive maps.  Under Scotland’s universalist,
“bottom-up” approach,234 all land is potentially subject to access, and
landowners, access takers, and local officials were encouraged to enter
into a long term, evolving dialogue about how to accommodate each
other’s needs—landowners’ legitimate land management interests,
homeowners’ privacy and personal enjoyment needs, and the public’s
interest in responsible access taking.
Land Excluded from Access: Not surprisingly, both of the new
access regimes in Britain specifically exclude from land otherwise sub-
ject to public access certain sub-categories of land being put to particu-
lar uses.  Yet even here there are discernable differences in approach.
Under both regimes, for instance, fields where crops are growing or
have been sown are generally exempt from access.235  In Scotland,
however, the public still can exercise access rights in certain agricul-
tural settings: in the margins of fields where crops are growing; in
woodlands, orchards, and tree farms, unless the land is being used to
cultivate “tree seedlings”; and in grassland where grass is being grown
for hay or silage, except where it is at a late stage of growth and likely
to be damaged.236  Scotland, it seems, has gone out of its way to pre-
serve as much access as possible in and around agricultural fields,
woodlands subject to active forestry management, and productive
grasslands, while recognizing that sometimes and in some places land
management interests require exclusion.
Next, both regimes exempt from access land on which a building is
located, along with the curtilage of non-residential buildings and other
232. Katz, supra note 59, at 276–80.
233. Rowan-Robinson, supra note 100, at 1394.
234. Id.
235. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 6(1)(i); Countryside and Rights of
Way Act, 2000, c. 37, sch. 1(1) (Eng. & Wales).
236. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 7(10)(a)–(c).
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works, plants, and fixed machinery.237  In this case, Scotland actually
provides somewhat more scope for exclusion by also denying access to
land where there is a “caravan, tent or place affording a person pri-
vacy or shelter.”238  Still, even this respect for temporary shelters typ-
ically associated with outdoor recreation could be viewed as yet
another sign of greater solicitude for access in Scotland.
It is also not surprising, given the importance of sport in Britain,
that both regimes limit access to certain kinds of sporting areas.  In
England and Wales, golf courses, race courses, and aerodromes are
entirely off-limits.239  In Scotland, though, natural grass sports and
playing fields are accessible as long as they are not in active use (i.e.,
as long as a match is not underway) and access to other kinds of recre-
ational settings (for example, where “horse racing gallops” occur) is
prohibited only where access would “interfere with the recreational
use to which the land is being put.”240  Most remarkable of all, the
public in Scotland can, in principle, even pass over a golf course as
long as access is not taken across a green and does not interfere with
any actual golf game.241
In general, although there is a shared concern in both regimes with
protecting owners’ interest in lands dedicated to some obviously pro-
ductive economic use, with protecting some important (but not always
access friendly) public uses, and with assuring public safety,242 it
seems as if Scotland generally defines its exempt categories narrowly
237. Id. § 6(1)(a)(i), (b)(i) (exempting “a building or other structure or works, plant or
fixed machinery” and “the curtilage of a building which is not a house”); Country-
side and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, sch. 1(2) (Eng. & Wales) (exempting
simply land “covered by buildings or curtilage of such land”).
238. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 6(1)(a)(ii).
239. Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, sch. 1(7) (Eng. & Wales).
240. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 7(7)(a)–(b) (modifying § 6(1)(e)).
Access is also prohibited on sports or playing fields with artificial surfaces. Id.
§ 7(7)(c); see also SCOTTISH NATURAL HERITAGE, SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE
§ 2.11 [hereinafter SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE] (setting forth places where
access rights do not apply).
241. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 7(7)(b) (modifying § 6(1)(e)); see
SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE, supra note 240, § 2.2.  Similarly, access is pro-
hibited on bowling greens, cricket squares, lawn tennis courts, or other similar
areas where grass is grown and prepared for a particular recreational use. Id.
242. Other areas where access rights do not apply in Scotland include school grounds,
Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 6(1)(b)(iii), surface mines and
quarries, id. § 6(1)(h), construction, engineering and demolition sites, id.
§ 6(1)(g)(i), visitor attractions or other places (e.g., castles, historic sites, amuse-
ment parks) that generally charge an entry fee for admission, id. § 6(1)(f), and
places like military bases, airfields, and railway sites where access is restricted
by other statutes, id. § 6(1)(d). See also SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE, supra
note 240, § 2.11 (setting forth places where access rights do not apply).  Similarly,
in England and Wales, the other specifically excluded areas include surface
mines and quarries, land used for railways and tramways, land used for tempo-
rary detention of livestock or for training racehorses, and military bases.  Coun-
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to provide as wide a margin as possible for the exercise of access
rights.  Moreover Scotland repeatedly demonstrates a remarkable
amount of trust in the common sense and good judgment of members
of the public to decide when access taking would cause unreasonable
interference in many borderline cases.243
The final significant difference concerning exempted lands lies in
how the two schemes deal with the problem of providing a buffer of
private space around homes and residences.  In England and Wales,
the CRoW Act once again employs a boundary line drawing approach
and specifically exempts “land within 20 meters of a dwelling” and,
somewhat more indefinitely, land used as a “park or garden.”244  In
Scotland, however, section 6(1)(b)(iv) of the LRSA provides that mem-
bers of the public do not have a right of access to land that “comprises”
in relation to a house, or any other place providing a person shelter or
privacy, “sufficient adjacent land to enable persons living there to
have reasonable measures of privacy in that house or place and to en-
sure that their enjoyment of that house or place is not unreasonably
disturbed.”245  In Scotland, then, homeowners and other occupants of
homes can exclude the public from enough land next to their dwellings
so that they can enjoy a “reasonable” degree of privacy and freedom
from disturbance.  The question of how far this zone of reasonable pri-
vacy and enjoyment should extend in any particular case is left to lo-
cal authorities, landowners, and access takers to sort out on their own,
and ultimately, when these parties cannot reach agreement among
themselves, to the courts.  The only interpretative assistance provided
by the Act is a brief statement indicating that “the location and other
characteristics of the house or other place” are “among the factors”
which can be considered in making a sufficient adjacent land
determination.246
The two regimes’ approaches to dwelling privacy are telling.  The
CRoW Act’s twenty meter rule is certainly crystalline and easy to ap-
ply.  The possibility that it might be under-inclusive in some cases
(possibly for large country estates) is partially offset by the likelihood
that in many cases a homeowner’s zone of privacy and personal enjoy-
ment will be considerably extended by the park or garden exemption.
The LRSA’s resort to a classically open-textured standard of reasona-
bleness, on the other hand, leaves a great deal to be decided later.
Indeed, it is a crucial marker of Scotland’s embrace of contextualism
tryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, sch. 1(5)–(6), 1(11)–(13) (Eng. &
Wales).
243. The Scottish Outdoor Access Code drives home this principle repeatedly, devoting
an entire part of the Code to this subject. See SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE,
supra note 240, §§ 1.3, 3.1–3.64.
244. Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, sch. 1(3)–(4) (Eng. & Wales).
245. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 6(1)(b)(4).
246. Id. § 7(5).
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and interest balancing.  It evidences Scotland’s willingness to leave
the actual boundaries between public recreation and private enjoy-
ment to be delineated through negotiation and, if necessary, litigation
between interested parties.
B. The Nature of the Access Rights
The second major difference between the CRoW Act and the LRSA
is that that the Scottish legislation allows a far broader range of ac-
cess activities.  Consider the CRoW Act.  In England and Wales, a per-
son exercising access rights can enter and remain on access land for
the purpose of “open-air recreation,” as long as she does not break or
damage a wall, fence, hedge, stile, or gate and she observes a set of
general restrictions applicable to all access land and special restric-
tions pertaining to the particular area she is visiting.247  At first
glance this seems broad, but restrictions soon follow.
Crucially, with the exception of those who use wheelchairs, anyone
going on “access land” must be on foot.248  This means that cycling,
horseback riding, mountain biking (and maybe even skiing or sled-
ding) are not forms of legitimate access taking in England and
Wales.249  In addition, a number of activities that might commonly be
considered part of “open-air recreation”—(1) using a canoe or
sailboard on non-tidal water, (2) bathing in non-tidal water, (3) engag-
ing in organized games, or (4) camping—are specifically prohibited.250
In short, the idea seems to be that members of the public can walk
onto access land, have a picnic, and then go home.251  Little else is
allowed.
247. Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, § 2(1) (Eng. & Wales).
248. SYDENHAM, supra note 157, at 219.
249. See, e.g., Katrina M. Brown et al., Claiming Rights to Rural Space through Off-
Road Cycling 2–5 (unpublished manuscript presented at the Annual Meeting of
American Geographers Apr. 17, 2008) (on file with author) (elaborating on signifi-
cance of lack of provision for mountain biking under the CRoW Act, despite its
widespread and growing popularity in the U.K.).
250. SYDENHAM, supra note 157, at 220–21; Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000,
c. 37, sch. 2 (Eng. & Wales).  Other prohibited activities include fishing, hunting,
and using a metal detector. Id.
251. See Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 407.  Apparently, one of the
reasons that the right to roam was so narrowly drawn was that opponents argued
that damage to wildlife and historic sites would result if a right was codified.
Angela Sydenham, The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000: Balancing Pub-
lic Access and Environmental Protection?, 4 ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 87–95 (2002).
Concerns about the damages that dogs would cause to game and livestock also led
to provisions allowing landowners to exclude dogs in various circumstances and
requiring dogs to be leashed.  Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37,
§§2, 23(1)–(2), sch. 2(4)–(6) (Eng. & Wales); Sydenham, supra, at 91.
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In contrast, the LRSA establishes two broad categories of “access
rights” that are literally granted to “everyone.”252  First, there is the
right to be “on land”—the right to go on, pass over, and remain on the
land for some limited period of time—for three specified purposes.253
The first and most important of these is “recreational purposes,”254 an
undefined category that turns out be much more expansive than the
concept of open-air recreation under the CRoW Act.
The second articulated purpose for being on land is “carrying on a
relevant educational activity,” which means furthering the “under-
standing of natural or cultural heritage.”255  Thus, a teacher and a
group of students visiting the outdoors to study wildlife, landscape, or
geology would fall within this heading, as would a group carrying out
a natural or cultural history survey.256
The third authorized purpose is carrying on one of the two previ-
ously permitted purposes in a commercial or for-profit manner.257
Consequently, a mountain guide taking a paying client hill-walking, a
canoeing instructor giving a group canoeing lesson, or a commercial
nature writer or commercial photographer could all take advantage of
the statutory right to be on land under the LRSA.258  Under the
CRoW Act, it is not clear whether this kind of commercial activity can
take place even if it might otherwise further open-air recreation.259
The second category of access rights under the LRSA is narrower
but still quite significant.  It is simply “the right to cross land,” defined
to mean going on to land, passing over it, and then leaving it “for the
purpose of getting from one place outside the land to another such
place.”260  In other words, it is a right of passage.  In principle, this
access right could encompass activities like taking a short cut across
someone’s land to get to work, school, or a bus stop.261  Although this
kind of passage was what many legally recognized footpaths were de-
signed to provide in England and Wales before the CRoW Act, it does
252. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 1(1)–(2).
253. Id. § 1(2)(a), (4)(a).
254. Id. § 1(3)(a).
255. Id. § 1(3)(b), (5)(a)–(b).
256. SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE, supra note 240, § 2.8.
257. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 1(3)(c); Guthrie, supra note 112,
at 133 n.53.
258. SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE, supra note 240, § 2.9.
259. Schedule 2 of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 does not strictly pro-
hibit commercial activity on access land by access takers, but the legislation else-
where does not affirmatively authorize it either. Countryside and Rights of Way
Act, 2000, c. 37, § 2(1), sch. 2 (Eng. & Wales).
260. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 1(2)(b), (4)(b).
261. Guthrie, supra note 112, at 133 n.54.
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not, strictly speaking, appear to be a protected activity under the
CRoW Act itself.262
Of course there are some restrictions on the nature of access taking
in Scotland as well, but once again the way that Scotland frames these
restrictions is very different.  First, and most important, the LRSA
conditions its broad grant of access rights on the premise that access
takers must use them in a virtuous, responsible way: “A person has
access rights only if they are exercised responsibly.”263  In determin-
ing whether this standard of responsible access taking has been met
“a person is to be presumed to be exercising access rights responsibly if
they are exercised so as not to cause unreasonable interference with
any of the rights (whether access rights, rights associated with the
ownership of land or any others) of any other person.”264  Under the
LRSA, responsible access taking thus means, first and foremost, act-
ing in an other-regarding manner.  It means being considerate of the
entire community, taking care of the natural environment, and taking
into account the interests and needs of landowners and of other per-
sons seeking to enjoy their own access rights.265
Despite this broad, open-ended directive to exercise access rights
responsibly, there are several activities that the LRSA specifically de-
fines as not falling within the sphere of responsible access taking and
are thus clearly prohibited.  One cannot be on or cross land in breach
of an injunction or to commit “an offence”; one cannot hunt, shoot or
fish; one cannot take access with a dog or other animal unless it is
“under proper control”; one cannot poach game; and one cannot use a
motorized vehicle or vessel other than a motorized wheel chair.266
Beyond this relatively narrow set of prohibited activities, though,
access takers in Scotland can do many things under the broad heading
of exercising their access rights.  They can take a walk, run a mara-
thon, orienteer, ride a horse, canoe, sail or windsurf, ride a mountain
bike, enjoy “wild camping,” explore a historic site, paint a picture, take
photographs, go sledding, fly a kite, rock climb, cross-country ski, ex-
plore a cave, take a swim, or join a professionally led nature tour or
262. Yet, as an access taker in England and Wales can always claim to be enjoying the
benefit of “open air recreation” at the same time she is traveling from one place to
another on access land, one cannot really say that passage or transportation is a
prohibited activity under the CRoW Act either. See Anderson, Right to Roam,
supra note 149, at 413 (discussing “means of transportation” as one of the public
values that the CRoW Act promotes).
263. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 2(1).
264. Id. § 2(2) (emphasis added).
265. For numerous examples of what responsible exercise of access rights might entail
in various situations, see SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE, supra note 240, pt. 3.
However, the code itself “is not an authoritative statement of the law.” Id. § 1.5.
266. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), §§ 2(2)(a)(i), 9.
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hill walk.267  They can do all of these things during the day or at
night.268  Further, when a person engages in any of these activities on
land subject to access taking, she is not, under the express provision of
the LRSA, committing an act of trespass.269  In effect, there are just
two fundamental limits to the exercise of access rights under the
LRSA: the duty to act responsibly with regard to others and the
human imagination.  In a profound way, the right of responsible ac-
cess instantiates a vision of human flourishing bounded by little else
other than common sense and a concern for the well-being of others.
C. Landowners’ Rights to Exclude Unilaterally and to Seek
Exemption Orders for Land Management Activities
The final area of significant divergence between the CRoW Act and
the LRSA lies in the scope given to landowners to act unilaterally to
limit or prevent access for land management reasons.  In England and
Wales, the basic position of the CRoW Act is that land managers—
land owners and all those acting for them—are granted a unilateral
right to exclude access to land for up to twenty-eight days in any cal-
endar year (with some limitations pertaining to summer weekends
and bank holidays when the public is most likely to want to exercise
its right to roam), as long as notice is given to the relevant local au-
thority.270  No justification for these closures is required, and these
unilateral exclusions can be used on separate days and on separate
parcels within one property.271  It is only when land managers want to
exclude the public or otherwise restrict access for more than twenty-
eight days or for some specified period every year that they must seek
permission from local authorities.272
In contrast to this primarily “legislative solution,” Scotland’s ac-
cess legislation takes what one commentator calls an “advisory ap-
proach” to this subject.273  The LRSA initially imposes a duty on land
owners “to use and manage their land and otherwise conduct their
267. See SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE, supra note 240, §§ 2.6–2.9.  For an enlight-
ening study of the ways mountain bikers are enjoying their access rights and
challenging conventional notions of what access taking means in Scotland, see
Brown, supra note 249, at 5–12.
268. See SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE, supra note 240, § 2.4.  However, nighttime
access taking could be limited in some circumstances. See Forbes v. Fife Council,
(2009) S.L.T. 71 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.); discussion infra notes 429–35.
269. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 5(1).
270. Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, § 22 (Eng. & Wales); Sydenham,
supra note 251, at 89.
271. Rowan-Robinson, supra note 98, at 1397.
272. Land managers must then show that the exclusion or restriction is necessary for
purposes of land management and the twenty-eight day automatic exclusion has
otherwise proven insufficient.  Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37,
§ 24(1) (Eng. & Wales); Rowan-Robinson, supra note 98, at 1397.
273. Rowan-Robinson, supra note 98, at 1398.
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ownership” in a way that is “responsible.”274  In determining whether
this standard of responsible management is being met, land owners,
just like access takers, are initially presumed to be acting responsibly
if they do “not cause unreasonable interference with the access rights
of any person exercising or seeking to exercise them.”275  The access
takers’ presumption of responsible access taking is matched here with
a presumption of responsible land management.  Land owners, like
access takers, are presumed to be virtuous and are held to a standard
of other-regarding behavior.
This presumption of responsible land management is fleshed out in
section 11 of the LRSA.  A local authority can issue an order—presum-
ably upon the application of an owner, but also on its own initiative—
temporarily exempting land from access taking for some particular
purpose for up to five days without having to seek either public consul-
tation or Ministerial approval.276  If the order is to last for six or more
days, however, the local authority must consult the owner of the land
(though presumably the owner has provoked the application) as well
as the local access forum, provide public notice of the purpose and ef-
fect of the proposed order, and obtain confirmation by government
ministers.277
Thus, if a land owner wants to restrict or redirect access for less
than six days for some typical but short term land management pur-
pose—say, to spray crops with pesticides, to move farm animals from
one field to another, or to facilitate timber felling—the owner can do
so simply by posting signs and flags requesting access takers to avoid
these activities or by providing alternative routes to circumvent
them.278  If the owner wants to completely restrict access to his land
for some purpose for less than six days—perhaps to host an agricul-
tural show, a motor car or motor cycle rally, or a Highland games festi-
274. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 3(1).
275. Id. § 3(2) (emphasis added).
276. Id. § 11(1)–(2); SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE, supra note 240, § 4.14 n.54.
277. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 11(2)–(3).
278. See SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE, supra note 240, § 4.9, 4.11–4.15. But see
id. §§ 4.7–4.9 (“The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 states that for the purpose
or main purpose of preventing or deterring any person entitled to exercise access
rights from responsibly doing so, you must not . . . put up any sign or notice.  This
essentially means not obstructing or hindering people from exercising access
rights, either by physically obstructing access or by otherwise discouraging or
intimidating them. . . .  Obviously, land management involves putting up signs or
notices, building fences or walls . . . and many other tasks.  Given this, there is a
need to define the point at which an action is deemed to be either deliberate or
unreasonable in obstructing or hindering someone from exercising access
rights.”) (citing Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 14).
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val—he must seek the consent of the local authorities.279  Any
interruption of access occurring for six days or more will require the
initiation of a public notice, comment, and review process and consent
by higher level government ministers.  This basic approach reflects
the Access Forum’s recommendation that any arrangements for limi-
tation on access “should [be] of an advisory nature with guidance on
their use being given in the Access Code.”280
One final restriction on landowners merits special attention.  Sec-
tion 14 of LRSA states that landowners cannot put up signs or notices,
fences or walls, allow vegetation or hedges to grow, leave animals at
large, or take or fail to take any other action, “for the purpose or for
the main purpose of preventing or deterring any person entitled to
exercise [access] rights from doing so.”281  A violation of this prohibi-
tion against preventing or deterring access rights can be met with a
written notice from the local authorities demanding that the land-
owner remedy the obstruction or deterrence, and if the landowner fails
to act, the local authority can remove it or take some other remedial
action.282  An owner who objects to such a section 14 notice can pro-
ceed to the local sheriff court to contest it.283  Disputes over these sec-
tion 14 notices have given rise to a number of the judicial decisions
that have begun to interpret the LRSA.
VI. SCOTTISH CASES INTERPRETING THE LRSA 2003
Given the remarkable geographic reach of the LRSA and its reli-
ance on several broad, open-textured standards to delimit private
landowners’ ability to exclude and restrict public access, it is not sur-
prising that Scottish courts would soon be called upon to interpret the
Act and to begin to draw some of the boundaries that the Scottish Par-
liament declined to draw.  In fact, unlike in England and Wales,
where the CRoW Act sparked relatively little litigation concerning the
“right to roam” other than administrative appeals concerning whether
certain land is “open country”284 within the terms of the Act,285 dis-
279. Id. § 4.14. See generally SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE, PART 1 LAND REFORM (SCOTLAND)
ACT 2003: GUIDANCE FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND NATIONAL PARK AUTHORITIES
(2005), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/36496/0014290.pdf.
280. Rowan-Robinson, supra note 98, at 1398.  The idea was that land managers could
simply advise the public at key access points of the need to avoid entering certain
areas, and these restraints would be as short in duration and narrow in scope as
possible. Id.
281. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 14(1).
282. Id. § 14(2)–(3).
283. Id. § 14(4).
284. Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, §§ 1(1)(a), 2(1) (Eng. & Wales)
(defining “access land” as “any land which is shown as ‘open country’” and provid-
ing that “any person is entitled . . . to enter and remain on any access land for the
purposes of open-air recreation”).
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putes over implementation of the LRSA have so far produced at least
eight jurisprudentially significant court decisions.  These decisions il-
lustrate how the LRSA is beginning to create a property regime that
aims to promote certain important aspects of human flourishing while
at the same time preserving a zone of personal privacy around homes
and allowing landowners to make important decisions about how land
may be used to fulfill their own life projects and even how to enhance
access opportunities for future access takers.
Within this growing body of LRSA case law, three important issues
have emerged so far.  The courts have been most frequently concerned
with the question of how much land adjacent to homes property own-
ers can exempt from access on grounds of privacy and the need for
personal enjoyment free from disturbance.  Several decisions have ad-
dressed whether barriers to or restrictions on access taking on land
otherwise subject to access taking are permissible.  In other words,
they are concerned with the extent to which land owners can impose
restrictions on how access can be taken and particularly whether
landowners can effectively zone various kinds of access activities on
their property.  Finally, one decision addressed the retroactive appli-
cation of the LRSA and, in particular, whether the Act applied to bar-
riers to access created prior to its effective date.
A. The Sufficient Adjacent Land Cases: The Emergence of
the Property-Specific Objective Test
The first major interpretive issue confronting the Scottish courts,
and probably the one that has attracted by far the most public atten-
tion, concerns application of the “sufficient adjacent land” exception in
section 6(1)(b)(iv) of the LRSA.  In five different cases, sheriff courts
have resolved disputes between landowners and local councils over
just how much land in relation to a house or dwelling is sufficient “to
enable persons living there to have reasonable measures of privacy”
and “to ensure that their enjoyment” of their homes is “not unreasona-
bly disturbed.”286  Faced with this open-textured standard of reasona-
285. These administrative decisions have not necessarily escaped public attention.
One involved Madonna and her husband Guy Ritchie’s successful appeal to re-
duce the number of acres classified as “downland,” which “qualifies as open coun-
try under the [CRoW Act]” on their 1132 acre estate from 350 acres to 150 acres.
Anderson, Right to Roam, supra note 149, at 409 n.261.  Another concerned land-
owners’ successful but controversial appeal that resulted in removing a popular
local rock feature, Vixen Tor in Dartmoor, from open country designation. Id. at
411–12 & n.275.  The technical analyses in these decisions, however, concern
whether the land at issue qualifies as mountain, moor, heath or down, not the
balancing of landowner and public interests. Id. at 410–11.  For more details of
these two emblematic CroW Act disputes, see Anderson, Countryside Access,
supra note 149, at  241–42, 246–47.
286. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 6(1)(b)(iv).
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bleness, the sheriff courts have responded by building a purportedly
objective test that at once seeks to cabin the scope for personal judicial
bias, avoid the need for re-adjudication whenever ownership or occu-
pancy of a home changes, but allow for the consideration of the unique
geographic and social circumstances of each case.  In short, the courts
have crafted a test—I call it the property-specific objective test
(PSOT)—that aims to take account of land’s memory and complexity
while simultaneously limiting uncertainty as much as possible.
1. The Starting Point: Kinfauns Castle and the Stagecoach
Tycoon
In the first, and best known sufficient adjacent land decision,
Gloag v. Perth & Kinross Council,287 the Perth Sheriff Court directly
confronted the issue of just how much berth to give a landowner seek-
ing to bar the public from gaining access to gardens and woodlands
surrounding a home.  What garnered so much attention to the case,
aside from its temporal primacy, was the fact the owner was Ann
Gloag, a successful business woman known throughout Scotland as
the “Stagecoach Tycoon,” who lived in Kinfauns Castle, a fine country
home surrounded by lawns, flowerbeds, water features, and wood-
lands.288  Gloag initiated this lawsuit because she wanted to enclose
with a six foot high barbed wire fence more than eleven of her twenty-
three acres—in particular not just the immediate gardens around her
architecturally significant castle but also parts of the surrounding
grasslands and woodlands, especially woods where undergrowth had
been tidied up, pathways had been cleared or restored, children’s play
equipment had been located, and a barbecuing site prepared.289
The first defendant, Perth and Kinross Council, the local authority
charged with administering the LRSA in this instance, asserted that
Gloag was simply seeking to enclose too much land—more, that is,
than was actually “sufficient” to ensure her privacy and enjoyment.290
The Ramblers Association, the second defendant, took the same posi-
287. (2007) S.C.L.R. 530 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.).
288. Id. at 533.  Gloag’s nickname is derived from the highly successful European in-
ter-city bus company—Stagecoach—that she founded. KENNETH REID & GEORGE
GRETTON, CONVEYANCING 2007, at 127 (2008).
289. Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at 533.  There were suspicions that the play equipment
and barbecue site had been located close to the perimeter of the enclosed area
(and a public highway) to manufacture the impression that this land was inten-
sively used by the household. Id. at 533.  However, after a site inspection, the
sheriff gave Gloag the benefit of the doubt, concluding that, except for the chil-
dren’s play area, “the pursuer intended the woods to be used by herself and her
family as suitable places for recreation and play.” Id. at 534.
290. Id. at 532.
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tion.291  Both defendants suggested that the line where Gloag could
erect a fence should be demarcated with reference to distinctions
drawn in the Scottish Outdoor Access Code between more and less “in-
tensively managed” parts of the “policies” typically found surrounding
larger country houses.292  Although the distance between the two
proffered lines was not always large (in some places a mere fifteen to
twenty feet),293 the battle was nevertheless joined.
No doubt aware of the great public interest in the case and the
likelihood that his decision would become an important precedent,
Sheriff Michael Fletcher took considerable care in hearing the evi-
dence, visiting the site, and articulating reasons for his judgment.  In
the end he ruled in favor of Gloag, concluding that the area enclosed
by her barbed wire fence was not more than sufficient to ensure her
reasonable measures of privacy and reasonable undisturbed enjoy-
ment, and thus she was entitled to keep her barbed wire fence in
place.294
Before reaching his final conclusion, however, Sheriff Fletcher ar-
ticulated several important legal principles that have reverberated in
subsequent LRSA decisions.  The first concerned whether access tak-
ers should be presumed to be “genuine” outdoor enthusiasts or instead
motivated by some “ulterior criminal or voyeuristic motive” or “an un-
healthy curiosity” about a dwelling’s occupants.295  Sheriff Fletcher’s
view was that it would be “rather naı¨ve” to “assume that the high ide-
als of the Act would be followed by the vast majority of persons who
took access to land.”296
This determination was problematic in two ways.  First, the LRSA
does not call for this kind of inquiry into access takers’ state of mind in
deciding how much land should be exempt from access under section
6(1)(b)(iv).  If anything, the sheriff’s view plainly contradicts the
291. Id.  The Director of the Ramblers Association, David Morris, played a major role
in sparking this litigation.  During an unannounced visit to Gloag’s property to
investigate whether access rights were being obstructed by her fence, Morris
slipped through the front gate and then encountered the driver of a Land Rover
who challenged his entry and later called four police offers to the scene. Id. at
537–38.  Morris’ conversations were reportedly civil but unappreciated by Gloag
and the sheriff, who thought Morris was acting irresponsibly by going onto land
that he knew to be excluded from access taking under the Act. Id. at 537–39.
292. Id. at 540–42; SCOTTISH OUTDOOR ACCESS CODE, supra note 240, § 3.16.  Applica-
tion of these distinctions would involve observation of subtle landscaping details,
such as the height at which grass is mown and the quality of such grass. Gloag,
(2007) S.C.L.R. at 542.
293. Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at 548–49.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 537.
296. Id. at 539.
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LRSA.297  Second, Sheriff Fletcher lacked any factual basis to genera-
lize about access takers’ lack of good faith.298  Although subsequent
decisions have not expressly endorsed this specific line of inquiry as a
relevant factor in section 6(1)(b)(iv) sufficient-adjacent-land determi-
nations, it has become, as we shall see, a kind of jurisprudential leit-
motif.  The emergence of this judicial concern about “genuine” access
taking—and also with genuine landowner activity—should not come
as a total surprise, though, given the Act’s overriding emphasis on the
reasonableness of both access taker and landowner behavior.  Indeed,
it may be a predictable, and perhaps difficult to control, consequence
of what is, at least in part, a virtue-based access regime.299
Sheriff Fletcher’s second important determination concerned how
much interpretive weight, if any, should be given to the Scottish Out-
door Access Code in deciding where to draw lines under section
6(1)(b)(iv).  Here Sheriff Fletcher was on more solid ground in declar-
ing that even though the Access Code is not “entirely irrelevant,” it is
designed to offer nothing more than “help and guidance” to access tak-
ers and landowners and thus cannot provide any aid to a court in in-
terpreting section 6 of the LRSA.300  Although this ruling has been
endorsed by several academic commentators,301 it nevertheless seems
to give insufficient weight to the collaborative work that went into
drafting the Access Code and the importance that the Access Forum,
SNH, the Parliament, and others attached to it when the LRSA was
passed.
Sheriff Fletcher’s next crucial ruling concerned the degree to which
individual characteristics of a landowner should be considered.  Gloag
argued that her personal notoriety, her practice of entertaining VIPs,
297. See Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 2(2) (instructing that in deter-
mining whether access rights are exercised responsibly, “a person is to be pre-
sumed to be exercising access rights responsibly if they are exercised so as not to
cause unreasonable interference with any of the rights . . . of any other person”);
see also Malcolm M. Combe, No Place Like Home: Access Rights over Gardens, 12
EDIN. L. REV. 463, 467 (2008) (also noting the absence of a “genuine” access taker
in the legislation); Guthrie, supra note 112, at 135 (criticizing Gloag on the deci-
sion’s interpretation of “whose view of the ‘responsibility’ of access is to be taken”
and noting that Gloag looks at the issue from the view of the person taking access
but that this view “is almost certainly incorrect”).
298. Sheriff Fletcher’s conclusion about access takers’ motives seems to have been
based on his personal disapproval of the behavior of one individual, the Director
of the Rambler’s Association, David Morris. See Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at
537–39; supra note 289.
299. See Claeys, Virtue and Rights, supra note 59, at 934, 942–45 (observing risk of
making judges into “philosopher-kings” who must make subtle judgments about
whether certain parties, especially those who may be relative strangers to one
another, are acting virtuously).
300. Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at 541.
301. REID & GRETTON, supra note 288, at 129–31; Combe, supra note 297, at 465–66;
Guthrie, supra note 112, at 142.
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and the value of her possessions should all be considered.302  The de-
fendants countered that such an obviously subjective approach would
require constant re-assessment every time the ownership or occu-
pancy of a house or dwelling changed.303  Ultimately, Sheriff Fletcher
agreed with the defendants, observing that the language of the
LRSA—and especially its use of the terms “reasonable measures of
privacy” and “not unreasonably disturbed”—counseled against taking
into account “the individual proprietor for the time being” and favored
looking at the “the needs of a fictitious ‘reasonable occupant.’”304  In
short, the court clearly opted for what appears to be—at least at first
glance—an objective standard in interpreting section 6(1)(b)(iv).
Still, having declared the need for an objective test, in his very next
move Sheriff Fletcher opened the door to a more open-textured, highly
contextualized form of adjudication by stating that courts making
“sufficient adjacent land” decisions under section 6(1)(b)(iv) should
also consider “what a reasonable person living in a property of the
type under consideration would require.”305  To appreciate just how
contextualized (and perhaps subjective) this type of analysis could be
in light of the phrase “property of the type under consideration,” con-
sider how Sheriff Fletcher put this principle to work:
I agree with counsel for the pursuer that the evidence in this case shows that
persons living in a house of this kind located as it is in the country would
consider that their enjoyment of that house would be considerably reduced if
the house was not located in reasonably large grounds which were private.  I
think one can take from the evidence and applying judicial knowledge and
common-sense that persons capable of and interested in purchasing a house of
the kind which is the subject of these proceedings as their own private house
would not consider doing so if the house itself and its grounds, and by that I
mean a substantial area round the house were not able to be used by them
privately.306
The import of this passage is clear.  Although Sheriff Fletcher recog-
nizes the need to cast his analysis objectively in terms of the “average
reasonable person purchasing a house,”307 he nevertheless introduces
a wealth adjustment factor to his analysis of how much adjacent land
is “sufficient” by focusing on the expectation of a buyer that a “home of
this kind” would be surrounded by a “large area of ground,” including
“such things as the lawns and gardens of the house” and perhaps ex-
302. Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at 544.  Gloag asserted that this kind of individualized,





306. Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
307. Id.  The sheriff admits that the analysis he calls for presents “danger that one
might stray from the bounds of judicial knowledge into the bounds of private
knowledge.” Id.
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tensive woodlands, especially when they are developed with paths and
other amenities.308
In short, if a home is a large and impressive one sitting amidst a
large country estate, the occupant is presumably entitled to exempt
substantial amounts of land for her privacy and personal enjoyment.
If the home is more modest, the occupant needs and should expect far
less land for privacy and enjoyment.  The process of locating the pre-
cise boundaries of these zones of personal privacy and exclusive undis-
turbed enjoyment thus seems to depend on the size, prestige, and
social setting of the property at issue.  Judges applying the LRSA,
Sheriff Fletcher seems to imply, must make assumptions about what
the typical hypothetical owners of differently sized and situated Scot-
tish estates can reasonably expect in terms of privacy and personal
enjoyment.
This analysis embodies Sheriff Fletcher’s invention of the property-
specific objective test for determining how much adjacent land is suffi-
cient to provide a reasonable measure of privacy and undisturbed en-
joyment to homeowners and other dwelling occupants under the
LRSA.  Cast in the unobjectionable, seemingly neutral language of an
objective “reasonable man” standard, the test in fact creates room for
a highly contextualized determination of the physical and social cir-
cumstances surrounding each particular parcel at issue.  Such a test
has clear advantages and disadvantages.  On one hand, it has the ad-
vantage of flexibility.  It allows a court to take into account all of the
detailed circumstances that make up a given parcel of what Pen˜alver
describes as land’s “complexity” and “memory” for the purpose of mak-
ing the important boundary-drawing call required by section
6(1)(b)(iv).309  On the other hand, it has the disadvantage of leading to
potentially inconsistent, ad hoc decisions,310 and particularly ones
that will privilege the largest and wealthiest of landowners.  As Sher-
iff Fletcher’s intuitive analysis reveals, the average, reasonable per-
son buying a large estate like Kinfauns Castle probably would want
and expect a “large area of ground” to be available for her personal
use.311  The problem is that the LRSA does not grant large landown-
ers an entitlement to greater amounts of privacy and personal auton-
308. Id. (emphasis added).
309. Compare Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at 544–45 (applying what has been described as
the “property-specific objective test”), with Pen˜alver, Land Virtues, supra note 10,
at 828–30 (discussing the features of land’s “complexity” and “memory”).
310. This is one of the principal criticisms that Henry Smith launches at the progres-
sive property theorists. See Smith, Mind the Gap, supra note 35, at 982 (labeling
some of the progressive’s favorite decisions as partaking of “pernicious case-by-
case ad hocery”).
311. Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at 545.
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omy than owners of more modest estates.312  The property-specific
objective test that emerges from Gloag could thus potentially endow
large estate owners with far more space for privacy and personal en-
joyment in proportion to their actual dwelling spaces than other
homeowners.  Notwithstanding this potential for bias in favor of large
estate owners, it is not clear there was any better alternative given
the open-ended nature of the statutory guidelines.  Moreover, as we
shall see, owners of smaller estates are by no means powerless in as-
serting a section 6(1)(b)(iv) exemption on the grounds of privacy and
the need for undisturbed enjoyment.
In the final chapter of his analysis in Gloag, Sheriff Fletcher enu-
merated a number of specific factors that could fall within the broad
framework of his objective but property-specific approach to section
6(1)(b)(iv).  First, he considered the specific location of the property
and other physical characteristics of the house or place—the two fac-
tors specifically enumerated in section 7(5).313  Here he particularly
found that the “exceptional” quality of the house, its general promi-
nence, and its “substantial size” all weighed in favor of more, rather
than less, ground being required for the purposes of section
6(1)(b)(iv).314  Second, Sheriff Fletcher found that the security con-
cerns of the owner merited a larger, rather than a smaller, perimeter
of exclusion.315  Third, the sheriff deemed the prior location of fencing
and other boundaries pre-dating the LRSA to be a legitimate factor for
consideration, especially if these were not erected on the actual bound-
ary lines of the property.316  Finally, the sheriff found that the use to
which the adjacent ground is put by the homeowner will be a relevant
factor.  Here the existence of restored pathways and other amenities
were an indication that the owners of Kinfauns Castle would have rea-
312. This criticism has been leveled by several Scottish academic commentators. See
REID & GRETTON, supra note 288, at 131–32 (complaining that Sheriff Fletcher’s
analysis here lacks clarity and seems to presume, without any statutory basis,
that “large houses should have large gardens which are free from access rights”);
Guthrie, supra note 112, at 141 (criticizing Sheriff Fletcher’s analysis for failing
to realize that the “point of the legislation is not to guarantee owners an area of
land large enough to maximize enjoyment, but to ensure that their enjoyment of
land is not unreasonably disturbed”).
313. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 7(5); Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at
546.
314. Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at 546.
315. Here, Sheriff Fletcher deemed it legitimate to infer that the owner of a residence
like Kinfauns Castle would possess valuable objects entitling her to more “highly
developed” security concerns than other householders. Id. at 546–47.  The court’s
invocation of this factor has been questioned by some Scottish commentators.
See, e.g.,  Guthrie, supra note 112, at 142 (criticizing resort to this factor as di-
recting undue “attention to the characteristics of individual proprietors” and thus
being inconsistent with Sheriff Fletcher’s earlier emphasis on an objective
approach).
316. Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at 547–48.
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sonable expectations of privacy and undisturbed enjoyment extending
over the substantial area of ground on which they were found.317
These factors—all of which are tethered to Sheriff Fletcher’s property-
specific objective test—are the first signs of an emerging multi-factor
analysis for inquiries under section 6(1)(b)(iv).
2. Variations on Sufficient Adjacent Land: Snowie to Creeland
After Gloag, four more sheriff court decisions confronted the prob-
lem of how much adjacent land is “sufficient” to give land owners rea-
sonable measures of privacy and undisturbed enjoyment around their
homes.  These decisions further highlight the advantages and disad-
vantages of the property-specific objective test developed by Sheriff
Fletcher in Gloag.  In addition to revealing its inherent flexibility,
these decisions show how this approach can give judges the capacity to
detect landowners who are making unwarranted assumptions about
access takers’ motives, to make fine-grained assessments about the
privacy afforded by fences and gardens, and to recognize the legiti-
mate conservation aspirations of some landowners.  Yet, they also
show how the PSOT can lead to inconsistent outcomes and reveal the
information processing costs inherent in this kind of particularized, ex
post adjudication.
In Snowie v Stirling Council,318 proprietors Euan and Claire
Snowie contested the geographic extent of the public’s access rights
around Boquhan House and Estate, a property consisting of approxi-
mately seventy acres near Stirling.319  The Snowies sought to exclude
a large portion from public access under the “sufficient adjacent land”
exception and to close permanently a pedestrian gate at the end of a
long driveway.  Stirling Council, the local authority, insisted that
much less land should be exempt from public access and that the pe-
destrian gate remain open.  Once again the Ramblers Association was
joined as an additional defendant.320
Although the factual setting in Snowie was thus broadly similar to
Gloag, Sheriff A. M. Cubie ultimately required the Snowies to open
the pedestrian gate at the end of their driveway321 and dramatically
scaled back the portion of the Snowies’ estate that could be exempt
from public access under section 6(1)(b)(iv).322  He did, however, ex-
317. Id. at 548.  Again, Guthrie is critical because consideration of the use of adjacent
ground could encourage landowners to try to protect extensive areas by laying
them out for amenities (i.e., to game the Act).  Guthrie, supra note 112, at 141.
318. (2008) S.L.T. 61 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.).
319. The Snowie estate, purchased in 2001, consisted of seven different properties,
including stables, a tennis court, extensive managed driveways, and a garden.
Id. at 61–63.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 68.
322. Id.
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empt 12.6 acres from access under this exception, an amount that was
not so much less than the 14.5 acres of land Ann Gloag was finally
able to fence off around her castle in Perth.323
Several facts account for the different outcome.  First, Sheriff Cu-
bie noticed that even if the Snowies were allowed to keep the pedes-
trian gate closed, access takers would have found other ways to gain
access to their property.324  Second, despite occasional examples of ir-
responsible access taking (primarily teenage drinking, courting, and
driving), there was, in the sheriff’s words, a long term “core of regular,
indeed frequent, access taken by genuine recreational walkers, includ-
ing dog walkers.”325  In other words, Sheriff Cubie seemed to accept
the invitation issued in Gloag to investigate whether there were genu-
ine access takers interested in the land.  Nevertheless, on balance he
found that there was real evidence of responsible recreational use of
the property in this instance.
Next, the sheriff found that even though the Snowies had legiti-
mate concerns about security, a factor recognized in Gloag, these con-
cerns still did not justify excluding more than half of their large estate
from public access.  Two particular facts undermined the Snowies’ po-
sition on security.  First, the sheriff found the expert testimony of
their security consultant unimpressive and unreliable.326  More im-
portant, Euan Snowie apparently “regarded anybody moving around
the estate as ‘suspicious’” and repeatedly asserted that he had never
seen “any genuine walkers” on his property, despite the courts’ finding
that there were plenty of virtuous access taking neighbors.327  Sheriff
Cubie may have been suggesting that Snowie had not sufficiently in-
ternalized one of the LRSA’s primary meanings—that responsible
land owners must sincerely respect the rights of access takers.
Snowie’s failing here was, we might say, one of insufficient land owner
323. KENNETH G.C. REID & GEORGE L. GRETTON, CONVEYANCING 2008, at 114 (2009).
The precise area the Snowies were allowed to exempt comprised grounds in front
and immediately adjacent to their house, a car park, a tennis court and changing
area, and some of the other managed grounds, including a rear garden.  It did not
include driveways leading from the gates of the property to the house. Snowie,
(2008) S.L.T. at 68.
324. Access takers apparently could gain access to the Snowie estate through hedges,
through an active neighboring dairy farm which apparently enjoyed the right to
use driveways on the estate, from two public roads, and from a public right of way
which bordered the property. Snowie, (2008) S.L.T. at 61–62, 68.
325. Id. at 62–63.
326. Id. at 63–65.
327. Id. at 63–64.  This tendency to exaggerate safety threats and discredit genuine
walkers was typified, in the sheriff’s view, by an incident in which Snowie
claimed to have met a “suspicious and threatening” couple walking with “torch
and baton,” when in fact the baton was nothing more than a stick—most likely a
walking stick. Id. at 63.
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virtue or perhaps, to be even more precise, a lack of appreciation of the
virtues and needs of others.
In the end, despite these different micro-level factual conclusions,
Sheriff Cubie’s legal analysis in Snowie essentially mirrored Sheriff
Fletcher’s approach in Gloag.  Not only did Sheriff Cubie reject the
Snowies’ invitation to adopt an openly subjective approach to the sec-
tion 6(1)(b)(iv) inquiry, but he plainly adopted Sheriff Fletcher’s prop-
erty-specific objective test.328  Thus he easily—indeed too easily—
echoed the suggestion that anyone purchasing a large property like
Boquhan Estate “would require a reasonably substantial area of
ground” surrounding their house for purely private use.329  By making
assumptions about the privacy and personal enjoyment desires of
large estate owners, the sheriff again transformed the “sufficient adja-
cent land” inquiry into a consideration, not of what is sufficient to af-
ford a person or family reasonable privacy and personal enjoyment
around their dwelling, but of what someone purchasing differently
sized estates would want and expect, an inquiry that is nowhere indi-
cated in the LRSA.330
The next section 6(1)(b)(iv) decision, Ross v. Stirling Council,331
was actually a companion to Sheriff Cubie’s decision in Snowie, issued
on the same day, but it illustrates other complications with applica-
tion of the LRSA.  Here the plaintiffs, Lindsay and Barbara Ross, were
long-time residents and owners of a more modest, but no doubt pleas-
ant, dwelling known as the West Lodge, located next to the contested
west gates in Snowie and at the end of a long driveway leading to
Boquhan House.332  Prior to 2006 the Snowies controlled the gates.  In
August of that year responsibility for the gates (both pedestrian and
vehicular) was transferred to the Rosses pursuant to a lease.333  How-
ever, just like Boquhan Estate, the Ross property could not be made
more secure by blocking pedestrian access through the gates, as visi-
tors could still gain access to the Ross property at many different loca-
tions, including points near the West Lodge itself.334  Nevertheless,
328. Id. at 67–68.  Here, Sheriff Cubie’s rationale echoed Gloag: adoption of an openly
subjective approach could lead to “repeated applications being made depending
on the particular views, concerns, family circumstances and even prejudices of
any particular proprietor, which cannot be the purpose of the Act.” Id. at 68.
329. Id.
330. See REID & GRETTON, supra note 323, at 113–14.
331. Ross v. Stirling Council (Scot. Sheriff Ct., Apr. 23, 2008) (Sheriffdom of Tayside
Central and Fife at Sterling), http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/ross.html.
332. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 7.  The Rosses apparently own the land on which their house is situ-
ated, even though it is within the broader boundaries of Boquhan Estate. Id. at
nn.4 & 25.
333. Id. ¶ 10.  Sheriff Cubie suspected this lease arrangement was motivated by the
Snowies’ desire to avoid the effects of the threatened litigation with Stirling
Council over access rights to Boquhan Estate. Id. at n.12.
334. Id. ¶ 18 & nn.4–5.
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after the Rosses objected to the notice issued by the defendant Stirling
Council, insisting that the pedestrian gate be opened, litigation
ensued.335
Although he acknowledged their legitimate desire for extra secur-
ity and privacy,336 Sheriff Cubie concluded that the private gardens
on both sides of the driveway leading into the Rosses’ West Lodge
property afforded sufficient adjacent land for reasonable measures of
privacy and undisturbed enjoyment and therefore the pedestrian gate
must remain open.337  Other than to note cryptically that the “West
Lodge, while in a very scenic location, is not in the same category of
property [as the Snowies’ seventy acre estate], and accordingly will
give rise to different considerations about what constitutes sufficient
ground” for purposes of section 6(1)(b)(iv),338 he provided little gui-
dance as to what those other considerations might be.
The legal analysis in Ross generally mirrored that in Snowie,339
but two details are curious.  First, Sheriff Cubie observed that the
Rosses’ garden and related grounds were “well-defined” and thus “rea-
sonable access takers, to whom the Act is directed, would have no dif-
ficulty in recognising [and thus staying away from] the Rosses’
[private] ground.”340  The implication is that if a landowner goes to
the trouble of erecting and maintaining hedges, fences, and other
landscaping features circumscribing a garden, then those features will
tend to become the outer limits of the “sufficient adjacent land” sur-
rounding the dwelling, at least for a modestly sized estate like the
West Lodge.
Second, Sheriff Cubie noted that had he allowed the Rosses to pre-
vent pedestrian access through the West Gate, he would have effec-
tively prevented access to Boquhan Estate over which the public
otherwise enjoyed broad access rights via the long driveway terminat-
ing at the gate.341  In other words, a decision about access rights
across one parcel may be shaped by the public’s access interests in
another, neighboring parcel.  Thus, it is conceivable at least that even
if one property might otherwise be deemed exempt from access rights
on the grounds of protecting reasonable privacy (a result that might
have been obtained had the Rosses’ dwelling been located at the dead
end of an isolated lane, for instance), the possibility that such an ex-
335. Id. ¶ 14.
336. The Rosses had been victimized by a break-in decades earlier, a motor vehicle
theft, and the theft of some items from their garden, but Sheriff Cubie character-
ized these as “very limited incidents.” Id. at n.25.
337. Id. ¶ 19 & n.25.
338. Id. at n.56.
339. Id. at nn.48–55 & 57.
340. Id. at n.58.
341. Id.
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emption would inhibit legitimate access to neighboring land may war-
rant denial of an application to exclude under section 6(1)(b)(iv).
Is this a legitimate or logical interpretation of the LRSA?  If one
believes the development of a highly contextual, property-specific ob-
jective test is an appropriate response to the reasonableness inquiry
section 6(1)(b)(iv) seems to call for, the answer may be yes.  Progres-
sive property theorists like Alexander, Pen˜alver, and Singer would all
certainly agree.342  For those in search of a more certain, efficient,
“modular” approach to the problem of defining the zone of privacy and
personal enjoyment surrounding a home or residence and coordinat-
ing relationships between relative strangers, there could well be
doubts about this entire approach.343
The fourth decision interpreting the “sufficient adjacent ground”
exception, Forbes v. Fife Council,344 underscores even more dramati-
cally how the public’s new statutory right of access applies, not just in
relatively remote rural areas of Scotland, but also in more densely set-
tled areas, such as a “quiet suburban part of Glenrothes.”345  The dis-
pute in this case centered on an unlit and unpaved path located
behind the Forbeses’ house and adjacent to their backyard garden, but
separated from the garden by a six foot high fence.346  The path was
owned in common by the plaintiffs and six other sets of homeowners in
the same housing development.347  The path was not a public right of
way under Scottish common law even though it led from a nearby pub-
lic street to an open area of grassy land adjacent to another street.348
The problem concerned how the path was being used.  Daytime
users (such as walkers and occasional cyclers) were generally respon-
sible.  However, night time users, particularly teenagers, had begun to
engage in forms of “anti-social behavior” (for instance, littering, light-
ing fires, drinking, and engaging in verbal abuse) that disturbed the
Forbeses, their children, their dog, and their neighbors.349  Unhappy
with this situation, the Forbeses, with the apparent support of several
neighbors, sought to deny access to the path by erecting locked
gates.350  The gates led to litigation when the Forbeses appealed a no-
342. See supra section II.A.
343. See Smith, Mind the Gap, supra note 35, at 963–65, 968–69.
344. (2009) S.L.T. 71 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.).
345. Id. at 73.
346. Id. at 72.
347. Id. at 71.
348. Id. at 73–75.
349. Id. at 76–77.  One cause of the antisocial behavior may have been a decision by
the local council to close an “underpass” at one end of the path where teenage
antisocial behavior had previously occurred. Id. at 76.  This underpass closing
may have displaced the antisocial behavior to the path.
350. Id. at 72, 75–76.
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tice issued by Fife Council requiring removal of the locked gates.351
The Forbeses made two claims: (1) the path was not land subject to
access rights under section 6(1)(b)(iv), and, (2) in any event, the erec-
tion of locked gates at both ends of the path was not designed prima-
rily to prevent responsible access but rather for the benign purpose of
preventing anti-social behavior, and it thus did not justify sanction
under section 14 of the LRSA.352
Putting aside for the moment the disposition of the Forbeses’ sec-
tion 14 claim, there are several noteworthy elements of the court’s re-
jection of the Forbeses’ threshold contention that the path should be
exempt from access taking under section 6(1)(b)(iv).  First, Sheriff
W.H. Holligan emphasized that the “access rights conferred by the
2003 Act apply to all land throughout Scotland wherever that land
may be,” and thus “[t]here is no restriction limiting it to rural land.”353
If there were any doubts about the radical geographic reach of the
LRSA, this aspect of the Forbes decision put them to rest.
Second, while declining to adopt any kind of “general formula” for
balancing the interests of access takers and land owners,354 Sheriff
Holligan, like those before him, embraced the property-specific objec-
tive test for determining exemption from access rights under section
6(1)(b)(iv), commenting that application of the test “to a large country
house in an estate will clearly be a different evidential process from
that involving a suburban house and garden.”355  His particular appli-
cation of the PSOT to these facts reveals, however, even more starkly
its potential to lead to inconsistent results.  He openly admits that his
analysis of how much adjacent land around a house would be “suffi-
cient” would depend on whether it was occupied by one person or had
been “divided into flats and occupied by families.”356  Yet, he did not
explain how this would change his analysis.  Had the Forbeses actu-
ally sub-divided their house into two units, would this have dimin-
ished or enhanced the occupants’ expectations of privacy and personal
enjoyment on the adjacent grounds?  One can imagine arguments in
favor of the need for either more or less sufficient adjacent land
here.357
351. Id. at 71.  In due course, the local council issued a notice under section 14 of
LRSA requiring removal of the gates’ locks, which prompted the Forbeses’ appeal
of the notice in the sheriff court under section 28 of the LRSA. Id. at 72.
352. Id. at 78–79.
353. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
354. Id. at 79.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. If two families occupied the same house in different units, they might argue they
need and deserve even more elbow room for personal enjoyment.  On the other
hand, access officials could plausibly claim that by consenting to occupy a divided
house, these same families had already accepted and indicated their toleration of
less privacy and scope for undisturbed enjoyment.
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In any event, Sheriff Holligan next appears to add a new factor to
his PSOT inquiry—“how the access rights at issue are actually being
used and the occupants’ experience of their exercise.”358  In fact, this
may be just another manifestation of judicial concern with identifying
genuine access taking and being sensitive to the effects of access tak-
ing on residents.  Sheriff Holligan’s discussion of this subject implies
that a record of responsible or irresponsible access taking in the con-
text of the particular land at issue might dictate a wider or narrower
range of “sufficient adjacent land” for reasonable privacy and
enjoyment.359
In the end, two simple physical characteristics were most decisive
in supporting Sheriff Holligan’s conclusion that the path was not ex-
empt from public access under section 6(1)(b)(iv): (1) the existence of
the six foot high fence separating the pursuer’s garden from the path
and (2) the distance—never specified—between the fence and the
house (i.e., the size of the backyard garden).360  Just like the fence and
private gardens in Ross,361 the presence of these simple physical de-
marcations seems to circumscribe the extent of excluded sufficient ad-
jacent land, at least in the context of modestly scaled properties in
suburban settings.  The curious impression given by this decision and
Sheriff Cubie’s decision in Ross on this front then is that landowners
with pre-existing fences and hedges that are set close by their homes
may find themselves with more modest claims to privacy and undis-
turbed enjoyment than if there had never been any such barriers to
access on their estates at all.
The final “sufficient adjacent land” decision, Creelman v. Argyll
and Bute Council,362 further illustrates how the property-specific ob-
jective test can be employed to discern contextual detail.  In this case,
Robin and Myra Creelman, a married couple who jointly own six acres
of land in Argyll, sought to have their land declared exempt from ac-
cess taking under section 6(1)(b)(iv).  Employing the PSOT,363 Sheriff
358. Forbes, (2009) S.L.T. at 79.
359. Id. (“Take a simple example of a house in the middle of an area of land.  If there is
evidence that persons regularly exercising rights of access over the field do so by
passing very close to the house, that evidence may be relevant in helping to set
the bounds of what is sufficient adjacent land.”).
360. Id. at 80.  Sheriff Holligan also mentioned the fact that the path had existed “for
some time” and that some of the Forbeses’ neighbors did not have any “difficulty”
with its use, but these observations appear not to have been decisive. Id.
361. See Ross v. Stirling Council, n.58 (Scot. Sheriff Ct., Apr. 23, 2008) (Sheriffdom of
Tayside Central and Fife at Sterling), http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/ross.
html (observing that the Rosses’ garden and related grounds were “well-defined”
and thus “reasonable access takers, to whom the Act is directed, would have no
difficulty in recognising [and thus staying away from] the Rosses’ [private]
ground”).
362. (2009) S.L.T. 165 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.).
363. Id. at 175.
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D. Livingston granted their wish, relying on myriad special facts and
circumstances in a striking example of how land’s complexity and
memory can be incorporated into an LRSA adjudication.364
What was so special about these facts?  First, consider the land and
the three structures found there.  The Creelmans’ six acre tract is long
and thin, consisting mainly of woodland gardens originally associated
with Dunans Castle, an important historic structure situated on the
parcel next door.365  The Creelmans’ five bedroom residence, known as
Stronardron, was built in the early seventeenth century.366  The sec-
ond structure on the property is the former lodge house of the castle,
known as Dunans Lodge, and is rented out by the Creelmans to holi-
day vacationers.367  The third structure on the property is a mauso-
leum believed to belong to the Fletcher Family and which may
continue to be used as the final resting place of future members of the
clan.368
The Creelmans’ personal engagement with their property was also
significant.  When they initially purchased Stronardron in 2000 and
Dunans Lodge in 2004, the flora was “overgrown and impenetrable,”
and the main driveway leading to Stronardron was “impassible and
had not been in use for approximately forty years.”369  Through their
effort and expenditure, the Creelmans cleared and repaired the drive-
way.370  They also made impressive efforts to restore the woodland
gardens between Stronardron and Dunan’s Lodge to their former
glory, taking special care to plant and cultivate original species of
trees and shrubbery.371  Robin Creelman described these horticultural
and arboreal efforts as a “life project.”372  Myra Creelman called them
the couple’s “main leisure interest.”373
Although the Creelmans occasionally allowed visitors to stroll
through the restored gardens and visit the Fletcher mausoleum,374
364. Id. at 168.
365. Id. at 166.
366. Id. at 165.
367. Id. at 166.
368. Id.  Apparently, the Fletcher family holds some private right of access over the
Creelmans’ property to reach the mausoleum. Id. Another curious feature of the
land in dispute is the Stronardron Douglas Fir, which at 83.79 meters is suppos-
edly the tallest tree in all of the United Kingdom. See Dunans Castle, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunans_Castle (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
369. Creelman, (2009) S.L.T. at 166.
370. The driveway bisects the Creelmans’ parcel, passes very close to Dunans Lodge,
is clearly visible from Stronardron, and is not bordered by walls or fences. Id. at
166.  The only safe and practical way to access the gardens is by using this drive-
way. Id. at 167.
371. Id. at 167.  The Creelmans spent about £10,000 in these efforts. Id. at 171.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 172.
374. Id. at 167.
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their property had generally not been the subject of much public curi-
osity.  This changed when the adjacent Dunans Castle property was
purchased by a gentleman, Dickson Spain, who approached the Creel-
mans and asked them for permission to take visitors through the
Creelmans’ gardens as part of a commercial tour of his castle.375
When the Creelmans declined, Mr. Spain reportedly quipped, “There’s
always land reform.”376  Apparently it was Spain’s complaint to the
local council regarding the denial of access to the gardens that ulti-
mately led to the Creelmans’ lawsuit against the local council.377
Given these curious facts, Sheriff Livingston acknowledged this
was a difficult case to decide.378  Yet, he concluded that the Creelmans
could exempt their entire property from public access under the suffi-
cient adjacent land exception for several reasons.  First, a host of
physical characteristics of the property—the proximity of the drive-
way (the route most access takers would use) to the house and lodge;
the absence of any kind of privacy enhancing hedge or fence alongside
the driveway; the relatively small size of the parcel given the presence
of not just one, but two substantial dwellings; the tract’s thin, narrow
shape; and the fact that two acres consisted of steep, unusable
slopes—all supported a broad claim to “sufficient adjacent land.”379
In addition, permeating the entire decision is Sheriff Livingston’s gen-
eral view that persons buying a property like this in a remote, rural
location do so because they value gardens and privacy more than those
choosing to live in urban areas.380  In the end, none of these factors
are particularly novel, and they all fall within the PSOT’s emerging
cone of analysis.
The most distinctive factor in Sheriff Livingston’s analysis was his
artful observation that the demand for access to the Creelmans’ land
did not come from disaffected but genteel local ramblers, as it seems to
have in other section 6(1)(b)(iv) cases, but from a “neighbor who
375. Id. at 171.
376. Id.  To his credit, there is some evidence Mr. Spain proposed a “shared venture”
in the tours. Id. at 172.
377. Id.  After the Creelmans erected signage and some barbed wire designed to deter
access to the driveway bisecting their property and Mr. Spain’s subsequent com-
plaint, the local council served the Creelmans with formal notices under section
14 of the LRSA. Id. at 167.  The council’s investigation of the matter conducted
by its local access officer and review by the local access forum was cursory and
unsympathetic, although it conceded that land to the west of the Creelmans’
driveway could be exempt from access taking. Id. at 167, 171, 173.
378. Id. at 174.
379. Id. at 174–75.  Although the court did not elaborate on this implication, it seems
that if some kind of privacy-ensuring hedge or fence had already existed, as was
the case in Ross or Forbes, the Creelmans’ need for a broader exemption might
have been diminished.
380. Id. at 166–67, 175.
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wanted to use the pursuers’ land for business purposes.”381  In other
words, the interest in access taking here was not really “genuine,” as
other courts have put it, even though the LRSA does specifically allow
for commercial advantage to be had in access taking as long as it is
connected to some recreational or educational purpose.382  In this
case, the attempt by one landowner to use the LRSA to exploit his
neighbor’s property for his own commercial gain was a step too far.  To
Sheriff Livingston, at least, this access claim was not really virtuous
enough to justify interference with the Creelmans’ privacy and per-
sonal enjoyment of their narrow but unusually interesting parcel of
land.
Looking back at all of these sufficient adjacent land cases, it is pos-
sible to assemble a growing laundry list of potentially relevant factors
in the emerging multi-factored property-specific objective test.  Those
factors include: (1) the size and prominence of the dwelling and the
estate;383 (2) the relationship between the size of the parcel and the
dwelling;384 (3) the public’s ease of access to the property;385 (4) the
history of genuine, or as the case may be, irresponsible, access taking
on the property;386 (5) the degree of landowner respect for legitimate
access taking;387 (6) security concerns of the resident;388 (7) the loca-
tion of old fences and boundary markers;389 (8) the use of the adjacent
ground by the resident;390 (9) the presence of fences, walls and other
privacy enhancing features around gardens;391 (10) the need for ac-
cess to the property by those seeking access to other properties in the
vicinity;392 and (11) the potential for commercial exploitation by ac-
381. Id. at 175.  Indeed, Sheriff Livingston observed that access takers generally had
ample roaming opportunities in rural Argyllshire. Id.
382. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 1(3)(c); SCOTTISH OUTDOOR AC-
CESS CODE, supra note 240, § 2.9.  Might the outcome have been different if some-
one other than Dickson Spain (perhaps Scottish Natural Heritage or some other
respected non-profit) sought access to the Creelmans’ land for purposes of leading
educational tours through the gardens formerly associated with Dunans Castle?
Should this matter?
383. See Gloag v. Perth & Kinross Council, (2007) S.C.L.R. 530, 545 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.).
384. See id.
385. See Snowie v. Stirling Council, (2008) S.L.T. 61, 68 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.).
386. See Creelman v. Argyll & Bute Council, (2009) S.L.T. 165, 175 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.);
Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at 539.
387. See Snowie, (2008) S.L.T. at 63–64.
388. See id. at 63–65; Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at 546–47.
389. See Gloag, (2007) S.C.L.R. at 547–48.
390. See Forbes v. Fife Council, (2009) S.L.T. 71, 79 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.).
391. See id. at 80; Ross v. Stirling Council, n.58 (Scot. Sheriff Ct., Apr. 23, 2008) (Sher-
iffdom of Tayside Central and Fife at Sterling), http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/
opinions/ross.html
392. See Ross, at n.58, http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/ross.html.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB403.txt unknown Seq: 70 21-JUL-11 12:36
808 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:739
cess takers.393  Undoubtedly, future decisions will unearth other rele-
vant factors.
B. Barriers, Section 14, and Zoning to Regulate
Irresponsible Access Taking
The second cluster of decisions in the newly emerging LRSA juris-
prudence examines the problem of barriers to, or restrictions on, ac-
cess in relation to land otherwise subject to access taking.  As some
Scottish observers have put it, these decisions are concerned with reg-
ulating how access can be taken, not where it can be taken.394  In pre-
cise statutory terms, the recurring issue is whether a barrier—a fence,
a wall, a hedge, a locked gate, a sign or notice—created by a land-
owner that has the effect of limiting or discouraging access taking was
constructed or erected for the “purpose or main purpose of preventing
or deterring” persons from exercising access rights (a violation of sec-
tion 14 of the LRSA) or for a benign, good faith, and thus unsanction-
able land management purpose.395  In essence, the issue is whether
the prevention or restriction of access is the primary goal or merely
the secondary effect of a barrier created by a landowner.396
Some of these decisions may be also be read as raising the question
of whether, and under what circumstances, a landowner may “zone”
land for different kinds of recreational pursuits or impose some “time
and manner” limitation on access taking on land otherwise subject to
access taking.397  In this sense these decisions provide a test of the
extent of land owner autonomy over certain land use choices in the
face of the LRSA.  The judicial responses are noteworthy for their
demonstrated willingness to open the door even more widely to subjec-
tive, and sometimes even speculative, inquiries into the personal cir-
cumstances and motivations of landowners, the behavior of access
takers, and concerns about the consequences of irresponsible access
taking.
393. See Creelman v. Argyll & Bute Council, (2009) S.L.T. 165, 175 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.).
394. REID & GRETTON, supra note 288, at 135; Combe, supra note 297, at 464.  This
dichotomy is generally apt but may be misleading in some situations because
some limitations on how property may be used for access taking that are upheld
under this emerging line of authority could have the practical effect of barring all
or most forms of access taking on land otherwise subject to access rights.
395. Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), § 14(1).
396. The issue might remind some American readers of the United States Supreme
Court’s analysis of First Amendment challenges to land use regulation of adult
entertainment venues where the Court has asked whether a restrictive ordinance
is “aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult motion picture theaters,’
but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding commu-
nity.”  City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); Young v.
Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
397. Malcolm M. Combe, Access to Land and to Landownership, 14 EDIN. L.R. 106, 107
(2010).
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1. Tuley and the Problem of Internal Zoning
In the leading decision, Tuley v. Highland Council,398 the Inner
House of the Court of Session effectively held that a landowner can
differentiate among different types of access taking and restrict one
form of access taking—here, horseback riding—to preserve the land’s
suitability for another form of access taking—namely, pedestrian ac-
cess.  Once again, the facts are arresting.  Graham Tuley, an accom-
plished retired forester,399 and his wife, Margot Tuley, the proprietors
of an estate called Feddonhill Wood in Inverness, had invested consid-
erable effort in developing their land as a recreational area welcoming
access takers of all stripes.400  After acquiring the property in 1992,
the Tuleys created or improved a number of paths, labored to keep
them clear and well drained, and increased their appeal by cultivating
flora and even providing seats for walkers.401  Although they specifi-
cally welcomed horseback riding on the southern half of their property
and actually created a bridle path for this purpose, the Tuleys sought
to exclude horses from the northern sector of their property.402  In
particular, they wanted to exclude equestrian traffic from a path
called the “red track,” because they feared that equestrian use would
severely and permanently damage this path and other smaller paths
branching off from it.403  Thus, the Tuleys erected padlocked barriers
that prevented horses from gaining access to the “red track,” while
allowing walkers to enter.404
After complaints were registered by several of the Tuleys’ horse-
back riding neighbors—including the owner of an adjacent commer-
cial stable that enjoyed a conventional servitude of egress along the
principal access track bisecting the Tuleys’ property and who wished
to lead four ponies ridden by small children along the red track a few
times a week—the local authorities eventually issued a section 14 no-
tice requiring the Tuleys to allow equestrian, as well as pedestrian,
access to this path.405  The Tuleys appealed the issuance of the notice
to the local sheriff court.406
Somewhat surprisingly, the sheriff refused to recall or vary the no-
tice, reasoning that the LRSA required him to assume that horseback
398. Tuley v. Highland Council, (2007) S.L.T. 97 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.), rev’d, [2009] CSIH
31A; (2009) S.L.T. 616 (Scot.).
399. Mr. Tuley is the originator of a forestry innovation known as the “Tree Tube” or
“Tuley Tube.” See Combe, supra note 397, at 107 n.6.
400. Tuley, (2007) S.L.T. at 97.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 99.
403. Id.
404. Tuley v. Highland Council, [2009] CSIH 31A [3]–[9]; (2009) S.L.T. 616, 618–19
(Scot.).
405. Id. at [1]–[2]; (2009) S.L.T. at 617–18.
406. Id. at [2]; (2009) S.L.T. at 617–18.
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riders would exercise their rights responsibly.407  Although the Tuleys
could post signs warning of the risks posed by irresponsible horseback
riding, more restrictive remedies barring all equestrian access to the
red track, he concluded, could not be implemented unless and until
real and permanent damage materialized.408  Not surprisingly, the
Tuleys were distressed.  If the sheriff court decision was allowed to
stand, Graham Tuley warned, he would cease to maintain any of the
paths in Feddonhill Wood and allow erosion and fallen timber to
render them eventually inaccessible to all access takers.409  After crit-
icism of the sheriff court decision by a number of academic property
lawyers,410 the Extra Division of the Inner House of the Court of Ses-
sion, Scotland’s highest court, reversed.411
The first branch of Lord Eassie’s opinion for the Court of Session
rested essentially on one factual finding and two important legal de-
terminations.  First, Lord Eassie found that the sheriff simply failed
to give proper weight to his own findings about the strong likelihood of
damage that would result to the red track and connecting paths from
regular horseback riding, particularly during wet weather.412  More
importantly, Lord Eassie stressed that just as access takers are pre-
sumed to be exercising their access rights responsibly under the
LRSA, so too must land owners be presumed to be managing their
land and conducting their ownership in a reasonable way.413  In other
words, he sought to underscore how the LRSA exhibits faith in the
ability of everyone intersecting with land to deal with one another in a
framework of good will and mutual regard, of shared responsibility,
not of competition and exclusion.  Lord Eassie also determined that
the sheriff had erred in limiting the range of remedies available to the
Tuleys in light of the real risk of damage.414  It made no sense that
407. Tuley v. Highland Council, (2007) S.L.T. 97, 108 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.), rev’d, [2009]
CSIH 31A; (2009) S.L.T. 616 (Scot.).
408. Id. at 110.
409. REID & GRETTON, supra note 288, at 138 (quoting Trees Can Lie Where They Fall,
Says Access Wrangle Man, INVERNESS COURIER, July 13, 2007, available at http://
www.inverness-courier.co.uk/news/fullstory.php/aid/3343;Trees_can_lie_where_
they_fall,_says_access_wrangle_man.html).
410. Id. at 136–37 (commenting that the sheriff’s decision caused a “sense of unreal-
ity” to settle over the reader); Guthrie, supra note 112, at 137 (offering the milder
complaint that “it seems unfortunate that the only remedy arises after the dam-
age has already been done”).
411. Tuley v. Highland Council, [2009] CSIH 31A, (2009) S.L.T. 616 (Scot.).
412. Id. at [26]–[35]; (2009) S.L.T. at 622–24.  Lord Eassie was especially critical of the
sheriff’s attempt to qualify the Tuleys’ expert’s testimony by suggesting that a
small number of horses trampling down the red track in good weather might not
lead to any significant damage. Id. at [30]; (2009) S.L.T. at 623.  As any visitor to
Inverness knows, inclement weather is not at all unusual in this part of Scotland.
413. Id. at [13]–[17]; (2009) S.L.T. at 619–20 (Lord Eassie derives this point from sec-
tions 2(2) and 3(2) of the LRSA).
414. Id. at [32]–[33]; (2009) S.L.T. at 624.
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landowners like the Tuleys would be required to allow a mode of ac-
cess likely to damage their land and would be prohibited from taking
reasonable precautionary measures that could preserve the land’s rec-
reational value for a broader spectrum of access takers.415  In short,
Lord Eassie concluded that the Tuleys were acting responsibly in
preventing equestrian access to the red track to protect its accessibil-
ity to pedestrian visitors.416
Although he could have stopped here, the second chapter of Lord
Eassie’s opinion addressed an alternative ground for appeal raised by
the Tuleys—whether section 14(1) of the LRSA should be read in a
strictly objective manner.417  If it were, the Tuleys warned, landown-
ers like themselves might be held in breach simply for posting warn-
ing notices or erecting any barrier preventing entry to land.  For
example, a landowner who put up a sign warning access takers not to
enter a wood where tree felling is being carried out could violate sec-
tion 14(1) when in fact her “underlying” purpose was simply to pre-
vent the access taker from getting hurt.418
Once again Lord Eassie agreed with the Tuleys.  Turning to legis-
lative history, he observed that the Scottish Parliament actually re-
jected an amendment that seemed to import such an objective strict
liability approach to section 14(1).419  By retaining the “protean” lan-
guage that now constitutes section 14(1),420 the final version of the
LRSA preserved, in Lord Eassie’s view, a court’s ability to make a sub-
jective assessment of landowner intention in cases like Tuley.421
Thus, courts can ask whether a landowner’s actions in putting up a
sign or notice, erecting a fence or wall, or planting a hedge or crop are
motivated simply by the desire to limit access, by a “genuine concern”
for access takers’ safety, or by some other benign or bona fide inter-
est.422  Indeed, Lord Eassie moved well beyond the facts of this dis-
pute to suggest the possibly wide scope of permissible landowner
decision making that might yet have the secondary effect of prevent-
ing or deterring responsible access to the land.  For example, he noted:
415. Id. at [33]; (2009) S.L.T. at 624.
416. Id. at [35]; (2009) S.L.T. at 624.
417. Id. at [36]; (2009) S.L.T. at 624.
418. Id. at [37]; (2009) S.L.T. at 624–25.
419. Id. at [38]; (2009) S.L.T. at 625 (The proposed amendment, Lord Eassie noted,
would have substituted the words “if it is likely to have the effect, (whether or not
intentional)” for the current language of section 14).
420. Id. (noting that the language finally approved for section 14 only classifies barrier
erection and similar acts as violations if their “purpose or main purpose” is to
deter or prevent access).
421. Id. at [41]; (2009) S.L.T. at 625.  Lord Eassie also referred to the “very protean
concepts [sic] of acting responsibly” that underscore the entire LRSA as endors-
ing a “subjective approach” to the application of section 14(1). Id.
422. Id.
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[T]he establishment of a hedge may have the foreseeable and direct result of
preventing access across what was otherwise open land but yet be done for the
genuine purpose of enabling the enclosure of livestock, the provision to the
livestock of shelter, and the provision of habitat for birds and other
wildlife.423
Cumulatively, the various aspects of Lord Eassie’s ruling in Tuley
are important in a number of ways.  The last branch of his opinion
concerning the primary purposes and secondary effects of certain bar-
riers to access could open the LRSA to subjective judicial inquiries
into landowners’ intention whenever local authorities assert that
these barriers have the direct or immediate effect of restricting re-
sponsible access under section 14.  Although it will complicate inter-
pretation of the Act and may sometimes lead to inconsistent results,
Lord Eassie’s approach probably represents the only responsible way
of preserving property owners’ core interest in making significant de-
cisions about the productive and recreational use to which their land
may be put in the context of section 14 challenges.
More generally, the decision in Tuley recognizes that land owners
should be able to make some decisions that render access activities
“compatible inter se by dedicating or allocating areas or paths to the
particular recreational activities in question,”424 or as one contempo-
rary Scottish lawyer put it simply, “to zone areas for certain uses.”425
This power allows land owners—in the words of Larissa Katz—to “set
the agenda” for how certain kinds of access taking can occur on their
property,426 as long as their regulatory actions are not motivated by a
desire to exclude all access taking, but rather by some form of the pre-
cautionary principle, and particularly by a desire to preserve the
land’s availability for a wider community of access takers.
The court in Tuley is not saying, however, that a landowner can
pick and choose among various forms of access taking indiscriminately
and prefer one form over another based on personal prejudice.  In-
stead, what earns the court’s respect here is what Eduardo Pen˜alver
might describe as the virtue of landowner “humility,”427 a willingness
to temper some current, intensive land use to insure the land’s value
for a wider community of access takers and other users in the future.
Finally, by ruling against the local authority and recognizing the
legitimacy of the Tuleys’ practical, conservationist land ethic, the
Tuley decision has, in an intangible but very real sense, helped to as-
sure the legitimacy of the LRSA.  Had the Court of Session allowed the
sheriff’s decision to stand, there might well have been a ground swell
of popular and political support for amending the LRSA or even re-
423. Id. at [42]; (2009) S.L.T. at 626.
424. Id. at [35]; (2009) S.L.T. at 624.
425. Combe, supra note 397, at 108.
426. Katz, supra note 59, at 277–78.
427. Pen˜alver, Land Virtues, supra note 10, at 884–86.
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pealing it.  By cabining what seemed to be the local access officials’
overzealous advocacy on behalf of a very narrow group of access tak-
ers—the Tuleys’ somewhat self-interested horse farm neighbors—the
Court of Session underscored the double-edged nature of the new cul-
ture of access in Scotland.  Both landowners and access takers must
act responsibly with regard to the needs of others.  Here it was the
Tuleys—the landowners—who seemed to have personified this new
other-regarding virtue of responsibility more than the small circle of
equestrian access takers that encouraged the local authorities to chal-
lenge the Tuleys’ management of Feddonhill Wood.  In sum, the deci-
sion short-circuited what might have been a very demoralizing
outcome for responsible landowners.428
2. Back to Glenrothes
One can appreciate the morale enhancing value of Tuley by observ-
ing how Sheriff Holligan used the decision to resolve the second issue
in Forbes v. Fife Council,429 the case discussed earlier concerning the
narrow path behind a modest housing estate in the suburbs of
Glenrothes that was held not to be exempt from access taking under
Section 6(1)(b)(iv).  Recall that in Forbes the plaintiff landowners
claimed that their erection of locked gates blocking access to the path
behind their house was motivated by a legitimate desire to prevent
irresponsible access taking by local youth engaging in antisocial be-
havior.430  After a lengthy, somewhat uncertain commentary on the
relationship between sections 13 and 14(1) of the LRSA and Article 6
of the European Convention on Human Rights,431 Sheriff Holligan
used Tuley to reach his own contextualized and pragmatic solution to
the section 14 issue in Forbes.
In the crucial portion of this part of his opinion, Sheriff Holligan
declared that section 14 “does not prevent a land owner from stopping
somebody exercising access rights where they are doing so irresponsi-
428. In other words, the decision in Tuley may help the LRSA avoid producing what
Frank Michaelman famously described in the context of U.S. takings doctrine as
“demoralization costs”—the costs that arise when property owners and their sym-
pathizers realize that the legal system will not afford them adequate compensa-
tion when their property rights are constrained by an alleged regulatory taking.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L REV. 1165, 1214 (1967).
429. (2009) S.L.T. 71 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.).
430. Id. at 72, 74–75.
431. Here, Sheriff Holligan’s opinion defended a fairly broad and probing scope for
judicial review of a landowner’s appeal from a section 14(2) notice. Id. at 80–81.
The defendant, Fife Council, had argued that a court’s ability to review a section
14(2) notice should be narrowly limited to establishing the accuracy of material
facts relied on by the local authority and the jurisdictional basis of its actions—
i.e., an administrative law model of judicial review. Id. at 80.
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bly.”432  Guided in the end by Lord Eassie’s admonition in Tuley to
look for the landowner’s “actual purpose” in taking steps that may re-
strict access rights, remembering “that it is only in exceptional cir-
cumstances that access rights may be terminated,”433 and noting that
the irresponsible use in this case seemed to occur mainly at night,
Sheriff Holligan concluded that a blended remedy was appropriate.  In
effect, he permitted the local authorities to insist that the gates to the
path be opened during the day to allow responsible access taking, but
he also permitted the Forbeses to lock them at night when antisocial
behavior was most likely to occur.434  Open during the day and closed
at night.  This is a modification of the LRSA’s general rule that access
taking can occur nocturnally, but it is probably a sensible one in this
“quiet suburban part of Glenrothes.”435
C. Fences, Hedges, and Retroactivity
One more recent Scottish decision interpreting the LRSA deserves
brief mention.  In Aviemore Highland Resort Ltd. v. Cairngorms Na-
tional Park Authority,436 a sheriff principal held that a fence erected
in 2004, after Royal Assent was given for the LRSA, but before Part I
went into force, would not be considered to violate section 14(1) even
though the fence clearly impeded public access over a path that had
long been used for passage by members of the public.437  By overturn-
ing the sheriff’s initial decision refusing to consider whether the Act
could have retroactive effect because of the long history of public use
432. Id. at 81.  The sheriff also recognized how difficult it may be to select an appropri-
ate remedy when the evidence in a case like this reveals a “mixed” history of
responsible and irresponsible access taking. Id. at 81–82.
433. Id. at 82.
434. Id. at 82.  According to subsequent reports of the case, Sheriff Holligan deter-
mined that the section 14 notice should be amended to require the gates be un-
locked during the day (from 8:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m.), and he awarded the
plaintiffs 50% of their costs on the basis that they had been partially successful.
See Scotways Court Cases Update June 2009, SCOTTISH RIGHTS OF WAY & ACCESS
SOC’Y (June 19, 2009, 3:10 PM), http://www.scotways.com/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=280:scotways-court-cases-update-june-2009&catid=37:
court-cases&Itemid=70.
435. Forbes, (2009) S.L.T. at 73.
436. (2009) S.L.T. 97 (Scot. Sheriff Ct.).
437. Id. at 100–01.  Here, the plaintiffs owned land in Aviemore, including part of a
road named Laurel Bank Lane, on which hotels, retail, and recreational facilities
had been constructed. Id. at 97.  Members of the public had apparently long en-
joyed unrestricted access along the lane from the main shopping area in the town
of Aviemore into the plaintiff’s resort, and likewise employees and guests at the
resort used the lane to gain access to the town. Id.  However, in 2004 the plaintiff
erected a fence (and apparently planted a hedge right behind the fence) at one
end of the lane. Id.  The local authority did not contest the allegations about the
fence but claimed it did not know when the hedge was planted. Id.
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over the route in question,438 and by rejecting the local authority’s
argument that the propriety of a section 14(2) removal notice must be
evaluated based on the state of affairs at the moment of the notice’s
issuance,439 the sheriff principal clearly circumscribed the potential
reach of the LRSA.
Not only are long-standing fences, walls, hedges, signs, and other
physical obstacles to access safe under this decision, but so too are
barriers erected in the shadow of the Act’s passage—in the roughly
two years between its passage in Parliament and the date it went into
force.  Perhaps the Scottish Parliament should have anticipated this
problem and assured more access by providing in section 14(1) that a
landowner or land manager who “maintains,” as well as puts up, a
fence, wall, or some other deterrent to access taking is in violation of
the Act.  However, as the sheriff principal pointed out, it did not do
so.440  At the end of the day, the land manager eventually took down
the fence and hedge, but only after it used its litigation victory before
the sheriff principal as a negotiating chip to resolve a separate dispute
over planning approval for an expansion of the resort facilities.441
VII. CONCLUSION
Having reached the end of this analysis of how the LRSA came
about and how it is beginning to operate in Scotland, we should reflect
on what this Article has been forced to leave aside and what it has
established.  First, this Article has not sought to argue that the LRSA
could quickly and easily be transplanted to American soil to revolu-
tionize our own property law.  There is no doubt that such a sweeping
re-conceptualization of the right to exclude would initially meet strong
resistance in American courts on Fifth Amendment takings
grounds.442  Some commentators, however, might argue that an
438. Id. at 99.
439. Id. at 100.
440. Id. at 100–01.
441. Interviews with Rob Garner, supra note 222.
442. Federal courts would be likely to declare a statutory scheme like that of the
LRSA an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. See Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (observing that if a state required pri-
vate landowners to make an easement across their land “available to the public
on a permanent basis in order to increase public access . . . there would have been
a taking”); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433
(1982) (proclaiming that “the right to exclude [others is] one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”)
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).  State courts
might react similarly given their history of declaring unconstitutional statues
that created easements for the public to walk on private beaches. See Opinion of
the Justices, 313 N.E.2d  561, 568–71 (Mass. 1974); Opinion of the Justices,  649
A.2d 604. 611–12 (N.H. 1994); see also Anderson, Countryside Access, supra note
149, at 250–52 (analyzing some of the cases noted above and concluding that an
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LR(US)A could survive such a constitutional attack because it would
create an “average reciprocity of advantage” for all property owners by
creating a right of responsible access everywhere rather than singling
out individual property owners or a small subset of them to bear the
burdens of government regulation alone.443  Alas, this is not the place
to work out these constitutional subtleties.
The Article has also not delved into the descriptive debate over the
extent and uniformity of the right to exclude the public from private
land in the United States.  It may well be true that the American his-
torical experience with legal impediments to access is not as mono-
chromatic as some courts have recently assumed.444  Future studies
will be necessary to answer those debates.
Finally, this Article cannot work out on a case by case basis just
how an LR(US)A, even assuming it could survive a constitutional
challenge, would change the outcome of particular disputes between
those seeking access to private land and landowners.  It is true that
cases concerning trespasses to land that involve motorized access or
are motivated purely by commercial gain would certainly be unaf-
fected.445  Similarly, the outcome of disputes over access to land or
buildings for purposes unrelated to recreation, education, or passage
would also most likely be unchanged.446  Other disputes, however,
particularly those focused on demands for recreational access to open
land like beaches and former rail road rights of way, might well re-
quire considerable rethinking if a LR(US)A were enacted.447
All this speculation aside, the primary purpose of this Article has
been to show that it is practically possible for a modern, democratic
nation committed to the rule of law, the protection of private property,
and open markets to create, if it wants, a property regime that to a
American “Right to Roam” law would be declared unlawful unless the statute
provided for compensation to affected landowners); Anderson, Right to Roam,
supra note 149, at 426–30 (same).
443. See Brian Sawers, Is the Right to Exclude Fundamental to Property? 83 TEMP. L.
REV. (forthcoming March 2011) (manuscript at 4, 6–7) (on file with author) (citing
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
444. Id. (manuscript at 15–30) (demonstrating that initially many American colonies
and states allowed a considerable amount of public access to unfenced, unculti-
vated private land for purposes of grazing livestock, hunting and fishing, and
even recreation and that enclosure of private land occurred only gradually and
fitfully across much of the United States); see FREYFOGLE, supra note 12, at 29–60
(same; also discussing a lost “right to roam” in the United States).
445. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
446. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).  If a dispute like Shack were to arise
under a hypothetical LR(US)A, the state might argue that access was justified for
purposes of education.  Then again, the landowner might be able to exclude ac-
cess to the buildings where migrant farm workers are housed.
447. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Raleigh Ave.
Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005); Matthews v. Bay
Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
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considerable extent replaces the ex ante presumption in favor of the
right to exclude that has come to be taken for granted in the United
States with an equally robust, but rebuttable, ex ante presumption in
favor of access.  Moreover, as this Article has shown, the creation of a
property regime like this does not happen overnight.  It requires years
of consensus building and collaboration by individuals and groups
from diverse backgrounds.  Further, it still may only arise when there
has been a history of dispossession that echoes powerfully in a soci-
ety’s collective historical consciousness and when the legal system has
otherwise failed to provide effective and reliable doctrinal means for
access to the countryside for a largely urban society with increasing
interest in recreation.  It also may be easier to establish such a system
in a society in which there has been a long history of implied licenses
and customary toleration of access.448
Crucially, this Article has demonstrated that it is possible to create
a property access regime that does not depend on further boundary
drawing and a narrow conception of the access rights that the public
might enjoy on private land.  Instead, a legal system can, we have
seen, establish a regime that is fundamentally open-ended in texture
and that aims to inspire a new relationship between landowner and
non-owner access takers, a relationship based on mutual respect for
the rights of the other.  Such a regime can, despite some unavoidable
uncertainty costs, incorporate and seek to inspire virtues of responsi-
bility, humility, and mutual regard.
Through its analysis of recent Scottish judicial decisions interpret-
ing the LRSA, this Article has also shown that a property regime that
pivots on an ex ante presumption of access can incorporate exceptions
to this presumption that employ open-textured standards of reasona-
bleness.  These standard-based exceptions in turn require landowners
and access takers to work out compromises on their own or courts to
assess the needs of access takers and landowners in individual cases
depending on the unique physical and social geography of the land at
issue.  Only time will tell if the Scottish courts’ initial efforts in estab-
lishing the property-specific objective test for purposes of determining
how much “sufficient adjacent land” various home owners are entitled
to claim will provide enough predictability to limit disputes and uncer-
tainty in this important gray area of the LRSA.  Similarly, it is too
early to judge whether the courts’ initial efforts to distinguish between
access barriers that are primarily and illegitimately designed to deter
or prevent access and those that are created for bona fide land man-
448. See generally Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETI-
CAL INQUIRIES L. 5 (2009) (describing how legal systems can draw on and incorpo-
rate customs into law most readily when the customs are already well known
throughout society and do not require significant extra publicity to become
understood).
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agement purposes will provide a long term workable solution to the
conflicts raised by section 14 of the LRSA.  Despite some rough edges
in their opinions, it appears that the Scottish courts have made a solid
beginning in their approach to both of these key interpretive issues.
Finally, as this Article has emphasized all along, we should ac-
knowledge that there is certainly an information processing and effi-
ciency cost to an endeavor like the LRSA and that those who crafted
this legislation were not insensitive to this.  In fact, the Scottish Par-
liament set aside a considerable amount of resources to educate the
public about the new access regime it was creating449 and imposed
obligations on local councils to establish “local access forums” and to
develop systems of “core paths” that might meet some of the newly
unleashed demand for recreational access in all areas of Scotland.450
Further research will be required to evaluate the success of these edu-
cational and advertising efforts and to assess the impact of the core
paths initiatives.
At this point, we can at least be certain of one thing.  The LRSA
has begun to create a new culture of access in Scotland by fundamen-
tally changing the legal relationship between landowners and those
who seek access to land for recreation, education, and passage.  Amer-
ican property scholars should watch carefully how this culture of ac-
cess continues to develop in the years ahead as they formulate and
revise their theories about the role that the right to exclude plays in
our own property law.
449. According to Rob Garner of Scottish Natural Heritage, the Scottish Executive
(now called the Scottish Government) allocated some £8.1 million per annum to
local authorities during 2005–09 in recognition of the costs of the new duties
under the LRSA (e.g., core paths planning, running local access forums, etc.).
The local authorities have more than matched that amount in their continuing
capital and maintenance spending on paths, and other running costs, as detailed
in annual monitoring questionnaire returns, available at http://www.scotland.
gov.uk/Topics/Environment/Countryside/16328/AccessAuthorities. Additional
funding, principally from Scottish Natural Heritage, has supported the advertis-
ing and educational campaigns about the LRSA and the Scottish Outdoor Access
Code. See Your Access Rights, SCOTTISH NATURAL HERITAGE (Dec. 10, 2009, 5:15
PM), http://www.snh.gov.uk/enjoying-the-outdoors/your-access-rights/; see also
ROB GARNER, SCOTTISH ACCESS LEGISLATION—THE FIRST 40 MONTHS (2009) (un-
published report) (on file with author) (reporting on funding and activities of
Scottish Natural Heritage).
450. See Land Reform (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 2), §§ 17–20 (imposing duty on lo-
cal authorities to draw up systems of “core paths,” publicize core path plans, and
then maintain, review, and amend them); id. § 25 (requiring every local authority
in Scotland to establish for its area a “local access forum” whose duty it will be to
advise the local authority on the exercise of access rights and the drawing up and
adoption of core path plans and to give assistance to the parties to any dispute
about access rights).
